Menachot 79a

שחטה ונמצאת בעלת מום רבי אליעזר אומר קדש רבי יהושע אומר לא קדש דברי ר' מאיר If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer says: The loaves were consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: The loaves were not consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, consistent with the dispute appearing in the mishna.

אמר רבי יהודה לא נחלקו רבי אליעזר ור' יהושע על ששחטה ונמצאת טריפה שלא קדש ועל חוץ לזמנו שקדש ועל בעל מום שלא קדש ועל מה נחלקו על חוץ למקומו שר' אליעזר אומר קדש ורבי יהושע אומר לא קדש The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a tereifa, as all agree that it was not consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, as all agree that it was consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, as all agree that it was not consecrated. And with regard to what case did they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions outside its designated area, as Rabbi Eliezer says: It was consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It was not consecrated.

אמר ר' אליעזר הואיל וחוץ לזמנו פסול וחוץ למקומו פסול מה חוץ לזמנו קדש אף חוץ למקומו קדש אמר ר' יהושע הואיל וחוץ למקומו פסול ובעל מום פסול מה בעל מום לא קדש אף חוץ למקומו לא קדש The baraita continues: In explanation of his opinion, Rabbi Eliezer said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time is disqualified and an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of intent to partake of it beyond its time the loaves were consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were consecrated. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified and an offering discovered to be a blemished animal is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of a blemished animal the loaves were not consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were not consecrated.

אמר לו רבי אליעזר אני דמיתיהו לחוץ לזמנו ואתה דמיתו לבעל מום נראה למי דומה אם דומה לחוץ לזמנו נדוננו מחוץ לזמנו אם דומה לבעל מום נדוננו מבעל מום Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I compared an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, and you compared it to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. Let us consider to which it is similar. If it is similar to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. If it is similar to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering discovered to be a blemished animal.

התחיל רבי אליעזר לדון דנין פסול מחשבה מפסול מחשבה ואין דנין פסול מחשבה מפסול הגוף Rabbi Eliezer began to reason: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to an improper intention, i.e., the halakha with regard to one who slaughters the animal with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from the halakha with regard to one who slaughters it with the intent to partake of it outside its designated time. And we do not deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to a blemish in the physical body of the offering.

התחיל רבי יהושע לדון דנין פסול שאין בו כרת מפסול שאין בו כרת ואל יוכיח חוץ לזמנו שפסול שיש בו כרת ועוד נדוננו משלא לשמו שפסול מחשבה ואין בו כרת Rabbi Yehoshua began to reason to the contrary: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification that does not include liability for excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, from that of a disqualification that does not include liability for karet, i.e., an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. And the halakha with regard to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time should not be brought as proof, as it is a disqualification that includes liability for karet. And furthermore, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that we deduce the halakha from a disqualification due to improper intention, let us deduce the halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, as it is a disqualification due to improper intention and it also does not include liability for karet, and the loaves of such an offering were not consecrated.

ושתק רבי אליעזר The baraita concludes: And Rabbi Eliezer was silent, conceding to Rabbi Yehoshua. In any event, it is clear in the baraita that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

ורבי מאיר מאי שנא שחטה ונמצאת טריפה דהוי פסולו קודם שחיטה ומאי שנא שחטה ונמצאת בעלת מום דלא הוי פסולו קודם שחיטה The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and discovered to be a tereifa the loaves were not consecrated, but if it was discovered to be a blemished animal Rabbi Eliezer holds that the loaves were consecrated, what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a tereifa such that it is considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were not consecrated; and what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a blemished animal such that it is not considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were consecrated according to Rabbi Eliezer?

בדוקין שבעין ואליבא דר' עקיבא דאמר אם עלו לא ירדו ורבי יהושע כי אמר רבי עקיבא אם עלו לא ירדו בפסולא דגופיה אבל לקדושי לחם לא The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir is referring to a blemish on the cornea of the eye, and his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said with regard to this type of blemish: Although animals with such a blemish are disqualified as an offering ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, and they are sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that if the animal is discovered to be blemished the loaves are not consecrated, says: When Rabbi Akiva said that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, he was referring to the disqualification of the offering itself, i.e., that once it ascended it shall not descend. But with regard to the consecration of the loaves through the slaughter of such an animal, he did not say this.

איתמר חטאת ששחטה חוץ לזמנה אם עלתה לא תרד חוץ למקומה רבא אמר תרד רבה אמר לא תרד § The Gemara continues to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the baraita: It was stated: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, if it ascended the altar it shall not descend. If one slaughtered it with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, Rava says: It shall descend and shall not be burned, and Rabba says: It shall not descend.

רבא כרבי יהושע ורבה כרבי אליעזר The Gemara suggests: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish. Accordingly, just as a blemished sin offering descends from the altar even if it has already ascended, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends. And Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, just as a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time does not descend from the altar, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area does not descend.

והדר ביה רבה לגביה דרבא מדהדר ביה רבי אליעזר לגביה דרבי יהושע And Rabba retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava and ruled that a sin offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends from the altar, since Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as the baraita teaches that he was silent and accepted the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua. Accordingly, the halakha with regard to an animal slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish.

ואיכא דאמרי אף על גב דהדר ביה ר' אליעזר לגביה דרבי יהושע רבה לגביה דרבא לא הדר ביה התם הוא דקאמר ליה נדוננו משלא לשמו אבל הכא אי דיינת ליה משלא לשמו אם עלתה לא תרד: And there are those who say: Even though Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabba did not retract his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava, because there, with regard to the consecration of the loaves of the thanks offering, Rabbi Eliezer conceded to Rabbi Yehoshua because Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Let us deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake. But here, if you deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, then the halakha should be that if it ascended the altar it shall not descend.

שחטה שלא לשמה [וכו']: אמר רב פפא שבק תנא דידן איל נזיר דשכיח ונקיט איל המילואים ותנא דידן עיקר מילתא נקט: § The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on Shavuot not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated. Rav Pappa said in bewilderment: Why does the tanna of our mishna omit the case of the loaves of the nazirite’s ram, which is common and is also not consecrated if the ram was slaughtered not for its sake, and teach instead the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, which was brought only by the Jewish people in the wilderness? The Gemara responds: And what is the reasoning of the tanna of our mishna? He taught the ram of the inauguration because it was the primary matter, i.e., it was the first offering to be brought with loaves.

מתני׳ הנסכים שקדשו בכלי ונמצא זבח פסול אם יש זבח אחר יקריבו עמו ואם לאו יפסלו בלינה: MISHNA: In a case where the libations that accompany the offerings were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.

גמ׳ אמר זעירי אין הנסכים מתקדשין אלא בשחיטת הזבח מאי טעמא אמר קרא (ויקרא כג, לז) זבח ונסכים GEMARA: With regard to statement of the mishna concerning a case where the libations of an animal offering were consecrated and the animal was then discovered to be unfit, Ze’eiri says: Libations are sanctified only upon the slaughter of the offering. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “To bring an offering made by fire unto the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, a sacrifice, and libations, each on its own day” (Leviticus 23:37), indicating that the libations complement the offering and are consecrated only upon its slaughter.

תנן הנסכים שקדשו בכלי ונמצא זבח פסול אם יש זבח אחר יקרבו עמו ואם לאו יפסלו בלינה The Gemara poses a difficulty to the statement of Ze’eiri from that which we learned in the mishna: In a case where the libations were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.

מאי לאו דאיפסיל בשחיטה לא דאיפסיל בזריקה What, is it not so that the mishna is referring to a case where the offering became unfit through its slaughter, and consequently the libations were not sanctified by the slaughter of the offering? Why, then, must the libations be left overnight in order to disqualify them? Evidently, the libations are sanctified being placed in a service vessel and not upon the slaughter of the offering, in contradiction to the statement of Ze’eiri. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to an offering that became unfit through the sprinkling of the blood; the libations were sanctified upon the slaughter of the offering, and therefore they must be disqualified by being left overnight.

כמאן כרבי דאמר שני דברים המתירין מעלין זה בלא זה The Gemara seeks to clarify: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: If an offering has two factors that permit it for consumption or for sacrifice, they can each elevate it to sanctified status without the other. Accordingly, although the slaughter of the animal and the sprinkling of its blood are both permitting factors for the libations, the libations were sanctified through the slaughter of the animal, despite the fact that the animal became unfit through the sprinkling of its blood.

אפילו תימא ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שקיבל דמן בכוס ונשפך The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and holds that both permitting factors must be performed in order to confer sanctity upon the libations, the mishna can still be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a case where the priest collected its blood in the cup for the purpose of sprinkling it on the altar, but the blood spilled out of the cup and could not be sprinkled. Nevertheless, the libations were sanctified, as the blood was fit for sprinkling upon the altar.

ור' אלעזר ברבי שמעון סבר לה כוותיה דאבוה דאמר כל העומד לזרוק כזרוק דמי And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in this matter, as Rabbi Shimon said: Any blood of an offering that stands fit to be sprinkled upon the altar is considered as if it were already sprinkled. Accordingly, although the blood was spilled after it was collected in the cup and was not actually sprinkled, it is nevertheless considered as if it were sprinkled.

אמר מר אם יש זבח אחר יקרבו עמו והא אמר רב חסדא שמן שהפרישו לשום מנחה זה פסול לשום מנחה אחרת אמר רבי ינאי לב בית דין מתנה עליהם אם הוצרכו הוצרכו ואם לאו יהו לזבח אחר § The Master said in the mishna: If there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that oil that one separated for the sake of this one meal offering is unfit to be brought for the sake of another meal offering? Likewise, shouldn’t libations separated for one offering be unfit for sacrifice with another offering? Rabbi Yannai says: The court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations that if they were required for the offering for which they were separated, they were required and are brought with that offering. But if not, e.g., where the offering was disqualified, they should be brought with another offering.

אי הכי שמן נמי שמן גופה דמנחה הוא The Gemara asks: If that is so, then shouldn’t it be that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the oil as well? The Gemara responds: The oil is part of the meal offering itself and cannot be brought for the sake of another meal offering, whereas the libations merely accompany the offering and are not an integral part of it.

וליתנו עליהן דניפקו לחולין גזירה שמא יאמרו מוציאין מכלי שרת לחול The Gemara challenges: If it is so that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations, then let the court tacitly stipulate concerning them that if the offering they are meant to accompany is disqualified, they shall emerge to non-sacred status altogether. The Gemara responds: It is a rabbinic decree that the court does not tacitly make this stipulation, lest people who are unaware of such a stipulation see that an item that was previously sanctified has become non-sacred, and they will mistakenly say: One may remove sanctified items from service vessels to become non-sacred.

השתא נמי גזירה שמא יאמרו נסכים שהפרישן לשום זבח זה כשרין לשום זבח אחר The Gemara objects: If the Sages did not tacitly make such a stipulation because they were concerned that people might mistakenly conclude that items that were already consecrated in service vessels can become non-sacred, then now as well, where the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be sacrificed with another offering, let there be a rabbinic decree against such a stipulation, lest people say: Libations that one separated for the sake of one offering are fit for the sake of a different offering ab initio.

התני מתתיה בן יהודה כגון שהיה זבח זבוח באותה שעה The Gemara responds: Mattitya ben Yehuda teaches that the mishna is referring specifically to a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. In such a case, there is no concern that people will reach this mistaken conclusion, as one who sees that the libations are sacrificed immediately with the other offering will simply assume that they were separated for the sake of that offering from the outset.

אבל אין זבח זבוח באותה שעה מאי נפסל בלינה אדתני סיפא אם לאו יפסלו בלינה ליפלוג וליתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים שהיתה זבח זבוח באותה שעה אבל אין זבח זבוח באותה שעה לא The Gemara objects to this: According to the explanation of Mattitya ben Yehuda, it can be inferred from the mishna that if there is another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then the libations are sacrificed with that offering; but if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then what should be done with the libations? They should be disqualified by being left overnight. If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: And if there is not another offering that requires libations, they should be disqualified by being left overnight; let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself as follows: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are not sacrificed with another offering.

הכי נמי קא אמר במה דברים אמורים שהיה זבח זבוח באותה שעה אבל אין זבח זבוח באותה שעה נעשה כמי שנפסלו בלינה ופסולין The Gemara responds: That is also what the tanna of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are immediately considered as if they were disqualified by being left overnight, and they are disqualified.

ומי אית ליה לרבי שמעון (בן אלעזר) לב בית דין מתנה עליהן The Gemara explained above that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and that he holds in accordance with the opinion of his father that any blood that stands fit to be sprinkled is considered as if it has been sprinkled. The Gemara also explained that the mishna allows for the sacrifice of the libations with another offering because the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be brought with another offering if the first offering becomes disqualified. In light of this, the Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, i.e., the father of Rabbi Elazar, accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations?

והא אמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר רב עמרם אמר רבי יצחק אמר רבי יוחנן תמידין שלא הוצרכו לציבור לדברי רבי שמעון אין נפדין תמימים לדברי חכמים נפדין תמימים But didn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to animals that were designated as daily offerings but that in the end were not needed for use by the public, and have inherent sanctity, how shall they be redeemed? According to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Since Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis, it may be inferred that according to Rabbi Shimon, one does not say that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the offerings.

שאני התם דאית להו תקנתא ברעייה: The Gemara responds: In general, Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them. And it is different there, in the case of the daily offerings, because they have an alternative arrangement through which their total loss may be avoided, as they may be left in the field to graze until they develop a blemish, at which point they may be sold. Since there is no arrangement for the libations save for sacrificing them with another offering, even Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them.

מתני׳ ולד תודה ותמורתה הפריש תודה ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה אינה טעונה לחם שנאמר (ויקרא ז, יב) והקריב על זבח התודה התודה טעונה לחם ולא ולדה ולא חילופה ולא תמורתה טעונין לחם: MISHNA: With regard to the offspring of an animal designated as a thanks offering, or an animal that is its substitute; or in a case where one separated an animal as a thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, in all three cases, the second animal, i.e., the offspring, the substitute, or the replacement, is sacrificed, but it does not require the bringing of accompanying loaves. This is as it is stated: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached” (Leviticus 7:12). The verse indicates that the initial thanks offering requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן מהו אומר תודה יקריב (אם על תודה יקריב) מנין למפריש תודתו ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ונמצאת הראשונה והרי שתיהן עומדות מנין שאיזה מהן שירצה יקריב ולחמה עמה תלמוד לומר התודה יקריב GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? The verse states: If he sacrifices for a thanks offering. From where is it derived that with regard to one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states that he shall sacrifice the thanks offering, i.e., as long as he sacrifices some thanks offering.

יכול שתהא שניה טעונה לחם תלמוד לומר יקריבנו אחד ולא שנים אחר שריבה הכתוב ומיעט מנין לרבות ולדות וחליפות ותמורות להקרבה תלמוד לומר (ויקרא ז, יב) אם על תודה יכול יהו טעונות לחם תלמוד לאמר והקריב על זבח התודה תודה טעונה לחם ולא ולדה ולא חילופה ולא תמורתה טעונין לחם The baraita continues: One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. Therefore, the verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two. Since the verse included the second animal as fit for sacrifice and excluded it from the requirement to bring loaves with it, from where is it derived that the verse also includes a thanks offering’s offspring, replacements, and substitutes as fit for sacrifice? From the fact that the verse states: “If for a thanks offering,” one might have thought that they would require loaves to be brought with them. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering,” indicating that the initial thanks offering itself requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.

שלח רב חנינא משמיה דרבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא לאחר כפרה אבל לפני כפרה טעונין לחם § With regard to the offspring, substitute, and replacement of a thanks offering, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥanina sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to the Sages in Babylonia containing the following statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The mishna taught that the offspring, replacement, and substitute do not require loaves only in a case where they were sacrificed after the owner achieved atonement, i.e., where the initial thanks offering was already sacrificed with its loaves; but if they were sacrificed before he achieved atonement, they require loaves.

הוי בה רב עמרם אהייא אילימא אחליפי תודת חובה אי לפני כפרה תנינא אי לאחר כפרה תנינא Rav Amram discussed this halakha sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked: To which halakha in the mishna is this referring? If we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, then there is no novelty in his statement. If his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with its replacement, the replacement requires loaves, we already learned this in the baraita, as it states: He may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it. And if his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found after the owner achieved atonement with the replacement, the thanks offering does not require loaves, this too we already learned in the baraita, as it teaches that only the first offering requires loaves.

אלא אחליפי תודה נדבה בין לפני כפרה בין לאחר כפרה טעונות לחם מרבה בתודות הוא Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring not to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, but to the replacement for a voluntary thanks offering. This too is difficult, because whether the initial thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with the replacement or after he achieved atonement, both offerings require loaves, as the owner is considered one who increases thanks offerings. That is, since he was not required to bring a replacement for the offering, if he brings another offering it is considered an additional voluntary offering, and a voluntary thanks offering requires loaves.

אלא אולד תודה נדבה בין לפני כפרה בין לאחר כפרה אין טעונין לחם מותר דתודה היא אלא אולד תודה חובה לפני כפרה טעון לחם לאחר כפרה אין טעון לחם Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring to the offspring of a voluntary thanks offering. This too is difficult, because whether the offspring was sacrificed before the owner achieved atonement with its mother or after he achieved atonement, offspring do not require loaves, as this is considered a leftover of the thanks offering, which does not require loaves. Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring to the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches that if the offspring was sacrificed before the owner achieved atonement, it requires loaves, but if it was sacrificed after he achieved atonement, it does not require loaves.

מאי קמ"ל דקסבר ר' יוחנן אדם מתכפר בשבח הקדש הוי בה נמי אביי כי האי גוונא The Gemara asks: According to this explanation, what is Rav Ḥanina teaching us by sending this letter? He teaches us that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, even though it is not the initial consecrated property. If one sacrifices the offspring of an obligatory thanks-offering before the thanks-offering itself, he achieves atonement with the offspring, even though it is an enhancement of the consecrated thanks-offering. Accordingly, if he offers it before its mother, it requires loaves. The Gemara notes: Abaye also discusses the letter sent by Rav Ḥanina in this way and reaches conclusions similar to those of Rav Amram.

איתמר נמי אמר רב יצחק בר יוסף אמר רבי יוחנן חילופי תודה נדבה בין לפני כפרה בין לאחר כפרה טעונה לחם מרבה בתודות הוא ולד תודה נדבה בין לפני כפרה בין לאחר כפרה אין טעון לחם מותר דתודה הוא וולד תודה חובה לפני כפרה טעונין לחם לאחר כפרה אין טעונין לחם With regard to the conclusions of Rav Amram and Abaye, it was also stated: Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one achieves atonement with the replacement for a voluntary thanks offering, whether the thanks offering was found before he achieved atonement or after he achieved atonement, the replacement requires loaves, as the owner is considered one who increases thanks offerings. The offspring of a voluntary thanks offering, whether it was sacrificed before he achieved atonement or after he achieved atonement, does not require loaves, as offspring is considered a leftover of the thanks offering. And with regard to the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering, if it was sacrificed before he achieved atonement, it requires loaves, but if it was sacrificed after he achieved atonement, it does not require loaves.

אמר שמואל כל שבחטאת מתה בתודה אין טעונה לחם כל שבחטאת רועה בתודה טעונה לחם § The Gemara cites additional halakhot with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering that was lost and another animal was taken as its replacement: Shmuel says: In any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in isolation for it to die, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it does not require loaves. And in any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it requires loaves.

מתיב רב עמרם מהו אומר (ויקרא ז, יב) התודה יקריב מנין למפריש תודתו ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ונמצאת הראשונה והרי שתיהן עומדות מנין שאיזו מהן שירצה יקריב ולחמה עמה תלמוד לאמר התודה יקריב יכול תהא שניה טעונה לחם תלמוד לאמר יקריבנו אחד ולא שנים Rav Amram raises an objection from the baraita cited on 79b: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? From where is it derived that one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering. One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. The verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two.

ואילו גבי חטאת כי האי גונא רועה דתנן הפריש חטאתו ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ונמצאת הראשונה והרי שתיהן עומדות מתכפר באחת מהן ושניה תמות דברי רבי וחכמים אומרים אין חטאת מתה אלא שנמצאת לאחר שנתכפרו בעלים הא קודם שנתכפרו בעלים רועה Rav Amram continues: Whereas with regard to a sin offering in a case like this, the Rabbis hold that the animal is placed in the field to graze, as we learned in a mishna (Temura 22b): If one separated his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its stead, and the first sin offering was found, and both animals stand fit for sacrifice, then he achieves atonement with one of them and the second animal shall be left to die; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: A sin offering is left to die only if it was found after its owner achieved atonement. It may be inferred from the opinion of the Rabbis that if it is found before the owner achieved atonement, it is placed in the field to graze.

שמואל כרבי סבירא ליה דאמר אבודה בשעת הפרשה מתה The Gemara responds: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: An animal separated as a sin offering that was lost at the time of the separation of its replacement, even if it was found before the replacement was sacrificed, is left to die. The principle stated by Shmuel is therefore correct, since in every situation in which a sin offering is left to die, a thanks offering does not require loaves.

אלא רועה לרבי היכי משכחת לה כדרבי אושעיא דאמר רבי אושעיא הפריש שתי חטאות לאחריות מתכפר באיזה מהן שירצה והשניה תרעה The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that even in such a case the second sin offering is left to die, how can you find a case where the sin offering is placed in the field to graze according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? The Gemara responds: It can be found in a case like that of Rabbi Oshaya, as Rabbi Oshaya says: If one separated two sin offerings, one to achieve atonement for his sin and the other as a guarantee in case the first one is lost, he may achieve atonement with whichever of them he wishes, and the second shall be placed in the field to graze.

והא גבי תודה כי האי גוונא אין טעונה לחם אלא שמואל כרבי שמעון סבירא ליה דאמר חמש חטאות מתות The Gemara challenges: But in a case like this involving a thanks offering, the animal does not require loaves. Therefore, if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in such a case the sin offering is placed in the field to graze, then Shmuel cannot hold in accordance with his opinion, since according to Shmuel, in circumstances where a sin offering would be left to graze, a thanks offering in the same circumstances would require loaves. Rather, Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: There are five sin offerings that are left to die; one is a sin offering that was lost and found before its replacement was sacrificed, and another is the case where a sin offering was separated as a guarantee.

והא רועה לרבי שמעון לית ליה כלל The Gemara challenges: But it cannot be that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon does not hold that there are any circumstances in which a sin offering is placed in the field to graze. Accordingly, if Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, how can he say: And in any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it requires loaves?

שמואל נמי חדא קאמר כל שבחטאת מתה בתודה אין טעונה לחם מאי קמ"ל לאפוקי מדרבי יוחנן דאמר אדם מתכפר בשבח הקדש קמשמע לן דלא The Gemara responds: In fact, Shmuel also stated only one principle: In any situation in which a sin offering is placed in isolation for it to die, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it does not require loaves. He did not state the second principle. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? The Gemara responds: Shmuel teaches us his statement to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering requires loaves if it is sacrificed before its mother. Shmuel teaches us that one does not achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, and the offspring of a thanks offering does not require loaves, which corresponds to the fact that the offspring of a sin offering is left to die.

אמר ר' אבא זו תודה וזו לחמה אבד הלחם מביא לחם אחר אבדה תודה אינו מביא תודה אחרת מאי טעמא לחם לגלל תודה ואין תודה לגלל לחם § With regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, Rabbi Abba says: If one volunteered to bring a thanks offering, and said: This animal is a thanks offering and this flour is designated for its loaves, then if the loaves were lost, he brings other loaves. If the thanks offering was lost, he does not bring another thanks offering, and the loaves are not sacrificed. What is the reason for this? The loaves are brought on account of the thanks offering; therefore, if there is no thanks offering, there are no loaves. But the thanks offering is not brought on account of the loaves; consequently, if the loaves were lost, the thanks offering is still sacrificed, and one brings different loaves.

ואמר רבא הפריש מעות לתודתו § And with regard to the distinctions between a thanks offering and its accompanying loaves, Rava says: In the case of one who separated money for his thanks offering

ונתותרו מביא בהן לחם ללחמי תודה ונתותרו אין מביא בהן תודה and some of the money remained after he purchased the offering, he brings, i.e., purchases, with the remaining money loaves to accompany the thanks offering. If he separated money for the loaves of the thanks offering and some of the money remained after he purchased the loaves, he may not bring a thanks offering with the remaining money.

מאי טעמא אילימא משום דרב כהנא דאמר רב כהנא מנין ללחמי תודה שנקראו תודה שנאמר (ויקרא ז, יב) והקריב על זבח התודה חלות מצות אי הכי איפכא נמי לחם איקרי תודה תודה לא איקרי לחם The Gemara asks: What is the reason? If we say that it is due to the statement of Rav Kahana, that is difficult. As Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the loaves of a thanks offering are themselves called a thanks offering? It is derived from that which is stated in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering loaves” (Leviticus 7:12). The juxtaposition of the words “thanks offering” and “loaves” indicates that the loaves are themselves called a thanks offering. Therefore, one who separated money for a thanks offering may use that money for the loaves as well. The Gemara explains the difficulty: If that is so, the opposite should also be the halakha, i.e., the thanks offering is called loaves, and it should therefore be permitted to use the money remaining from the loaves for the thanks offering. The Gemara rejects this: The loaves are called a thanks offering, but the thanks offering is not called loaves.

ואמר רבא הפריש תודתו ואבדה וחזר והפריש אחרת תחתיה ואבדה וחזר והפריש אחרת תחתיה ונמצאו הראשונות והרי שלשתן עומדות נתכפר בראשונה שניה אינה טעונה לחם שלישית טעונה לחם § And Rava says: If one separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost, and he again separated another in its stead, and it too was lost, and he again separated another in its stead, and the first two animals were then found, and the three of them stand fit to be sacrificed, the halakha is as follows: If he achieved atonement with the first animal, the second does not require loaves, as it is the replacement for the first, and the first was sacrificed with its loaves. But the third requires loaves, because it is the replacement for the second, which does not require loaves.

נתכפר בשלישית שניה אינה טעונה לחם ראשונה טעונה לחם באמצעית שתיהן אין טעונות לחם אביי אמר אפילו נתכפר באחת מהן שתיהן אין טעונות לחם כולהו חליפין דהדדי נינהו If he achieved atonement with the third, then the second does not require loaves, because its replacement, i.e., the third, was sacrificed with loaves, but the first requires loaves, because its replacement, i.e., the second, will be sacrificed without loaves. If he achieved atonement with the middle, i.e., the second animal, both of them, i.e., the first and the third, do not require loaves, because the replacement for the first, i.e., the second, was sacrificed with loaves, and the third is the replacement for the second, which was sacrificed with loaves. Abaye says: Even if he achieved atonement with any one of them, the other two do not require loaves, as they are all replacements for one another.

אמר רבי זירא וכן לענין חטאות הפריש חטאתו ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ואבדה והפריש אחרת תחתיה ונמצאו הראשונות והרי שלשתן עומדות נתכפר בראשונה שניה תמות שלישית תרעה Rabbi Zeira says: And so is the halakha for the matter of sin offerings: If one separated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another in its stead, and it too was lost, and he separated another in its stead, and the first two animals were then found, and the three of them stand fit to be sacrificed, the halakha is as follows: If he achieved atonement with the first, the second is left to die, as is the halakha with regard to a sin offering whose owner has already achieved atonement, and the third is placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish and can be redeemed, since it is the replacement for a sin offering that was not sacrificed.

נתכפר בשלישית שניה תמות וראשונה תרעה נתכפר באמצעית שתיהן ימותו אביי אמר אפילו נתכפר באחת מהן שתיהן ימותו כולהו חליפין דהדדי נינהו If he achieved atonement with the third, the second is left to die, because its replacement, i.e., the third, was already sacrificed, and the first is placed in the field to graze, because its replacement, i.e., the second, will not be sacrificed. If he achieved atonement with the middle, both of them, i.e., the first and the third, are left to die, because the second was sacrificed as a replacement for the first, and the third would have been the replacement of the second. Abaye says: Even if he achieved atonement with any one of them, the other two are left to die, as they are all replacements for one another.

מאי וכן מהו דתימא התם הוא דאיכא למימר מרבה בתודות הוא אבל הכא דליכא למימר מרבה בחטאות הוא אימא לא קמ"ל The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Zeira mean by: And so is the halakha for the matter of sin offerings? Why is it necessary for Rabbi Zeira to teach this seemingly identical halakha with regard to three sin offerings? The Gemara responds: It is necessary to teach that these halakhot apply with regard to sin offerings as well, lest you say that there, in the case of the thanks offerings, if one achieved atonement with the first animal then the third requires loaves, since it can be said that the owner is one who increases thanks offerings; but here, in the case of the sin offerings, since it cannot be said that the owner is one who increases sin offerings, as one cannot volunteer a sin offering, I would say that the same halakhot do not apply, and if one achieved atonement with the first sin offering, the third is left to die. Rabbi Zeira therefore teaches us that the third sin offering is considered the replacement for the second and is therefore left to graze.

תני רבי חייא תודה שנתערבה בתמורתה ומתה אחת מהן חבירתה אין לה תקנה היכי נעביד נקריב לחם בהדה דלמא תמורה היא לא נקריב לחם בהדה דלמא תודה היא § The mishna teaches that the substitute of a thanks offering does not require loaves. Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: In the case of an animal separated as a thanks offering that was intermingled with its substitute, and it is not known which is the thanks offering and which is the substitute, and one of them died, the other has no remedy. What should we do? If we bring loaves with it, this may be improper, because perhaps it is a substitute, which does not require loaves. If we do not bring loaves with it, this may be improper, because perhaps it is the actual thanks offering, which requires loaves.

היכי דמי אי דאמר עלי לא סגיא דלא מייתי ליה בהמה אחרינא ולחם ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא תודה והא לחמה אי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה והא תיהוי אחריות The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is a case where the owner said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, in which case he is required to replace the thanks offering in the event of its loss, then why is there no remedy? Is it not sufficient if he does not bring another animal and loaves, and says: If the one remaining from the intermingled group is the substitute, then let this additional animal be the thanks offering and these its loaves; and if the one remaining is the thanks offering, then let it be the thanks offering and these its loaves, and let this additional animal be its guarantee, which does not require loaves?

לא צריכא דאמר הרי זו The Gemara responds: No, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya is necessary in a case in which one said: This animal is a thanks offering. Since he consecrated a specific animal as a thanks offering, he is not required to provide a guarantee in the event of its loss, and the above remedy is not applicable.

סימן למודי"ם מיד"ת על"ה שי"ש שכ"ן דדמ"ה דא"י חל"ש מות"ר תמור"ה בחו"ץ חזקי"ה הפרי"ש חטא"ת לאח"ר יות"ר § The Gemara raises a series of challenges with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya that if a thanks offering was intermingled with its substitute and one of them died, there is no remedy for the other. The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the names of the Sages that raise these challenges: Lemudim, i.e., Levi, who was known as Lemedin before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; middat, i.e., Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta; ala, i.e., Ulla bar Abba; shish, i.e., Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi; sheken, an acronym for Rav Ashi and Rav Kahana; dedamah, i.e., Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna of Dimhorya; de’i, i.e., Ravina of Ikla. An additional mnemonic is provided for recalling the topics of these questions: Ḥalash, a contraction of ḥullin, i.e., non-sacred items, and shelamim, peace offerings; leftover; substitute; outside; Ḥizkiyya; separated a sin offering; for a guarantee.

אמרו למדין לפני רבי וליתי לחם ולימא אי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה אי לא ליפוק לחולין אמר להו וכי מכניסין חולין לעזרה Lemedin, i.e., Levi, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: But why is there no remedy in this case? Let him bring loaves for the thanks offering and let him say: If this animal that is extant from the intermingled pair is the thanks offering, then these are its loaves, and they will be consumed as the loaves of the thanks offering. And if not, i.e., if the extant animal is the substitute, which is sacrificed without loaves, then let these loaves go out to be consumed as non-sacred loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: But the loaves of a thanks offering must be waved in the Temple courtyard, and do we intentionally bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard?

וליתי בהמה ולחם ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא תודה והא לחמה אי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה והא תיהוי שלמים אמר להו משום דקא ממעט באכילה דשלמים Levi challenges: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be the thanks offering and these its loaves. If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and this additional animal should be a peace offering, which does not require loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This cannot be done, because he thereby reduces the time period permitted for consuming the peace offering, which is generally two days and one night. A thanks offering may be consumed only on the day it is sacrificed and the following night.

אמר לוי לרבי וליתי בהמה ולחם ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא תודה והא לחמה ואי האי דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה והא תיהוי מותר דתודה אמר ליה כמדומה אני שאין לו מוח בקדקדו Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if that animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be the leftover of the thanks offering, which does not require loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It seems to me that he has no brain in his skull.

וכי מפרישין תחלה למותרות Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains why: And does one separate an animal as a leftover ab initio?

יתיב רבי יצחק בר שמואל בר מרתא קמיה דרב נחמן ויתיב וקאמר ולייתי בהמה ולחם ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא תודה והא לחמה ואי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה והא תהוי תמורה The Gemara suggests another solution: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Naḥman, and he was sitting and saying: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be a substitute, as the substitute of a thanks offering is not sacrificed with loaves, and it may be consumed for the same duration as the thanks offering itself.

אמר ליה עני מרי ארבעין בכתפיה וכשר Rav Naḥman said to him: Answer me, my Master: The halakha is that one who separates a substitute is liable to receive forty lashes on his shoulders, and yet you say it is fit to separate a substitute ab initio?

רב עילא חלש על לגביה אביי ורבנן ויתבי וקא אמרי אם איתא לדר' יוחנן דאמר חוץ לחומת העזרה קדוש לייתי לחם ולותבה חוץ לחומת העזרה ולימא אי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא לחמה ואי לא ליפוק לחולין The Gemara relates that Rav Ila took ill, and Abaye and the Sages went to visit him, and they were sitting and saying: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If the loaves of the thanks offering were within Jerusalem, i.e., the area of consumption of a thanks offering and its loaves, even if they were outside the wall of the Temple courtyard when the thanks offering was slaughtered they are consecrated, then let the owner bring loaves and set them outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and if it is not, let them go out and be consumed as non-sacred loaves.

משום דאיכא ארבע להניף היכי ליעביד לנפינהו אבראי (ויקרא ז, ל) לפני ה' כתיב גוואי קא מעייל חולין לעזרה הלכך לא אפשר The Gemara responds: This too is not a valid remedy, because there are four loaves of the forty that one must wave. How would he perform the mitzva of waving them? Shall he wave them outside the Temple courtyard? He may not, since “waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30) is written in the verse, and waving performed outside the Temple courtyard is not considered “before the Lord.” Shall he wave them inside the Temple courtyard? He will have brought non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is not possible.

מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אם איתא לדחזקיה דאמר קדשו ארבעים מתוך שמונים לייתי בהמה ולייתי שמונים בהדה ולימא אי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא נמי תיהוי תודה והא שמונים דתרוייהו אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא תודה והא לחמה וליקדשו להו ארבעים מתוך שמונים Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: If one accepts the ruling of Ḥizkiyya, who said with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, then let the owner bring an animal and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this additional animal should also be a thanks offering and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be a thanks offering and these shall be its loaves, and let forty of the eighty be consecrated for it.

משום דקא ממעט באכילה דארבעים The Gemara rejects this: This is not a valid remedy, because it reduces the consumption of the forty additional loaves, as the priests may not be able to consume the four loaves given from the additional forty, and the owner cannot consume them because they may be the portion of the priest.

אמר ליה רב אשי לרב כהנא אם איתא לדרבי יוחנן דאמר הפריש חטאת מעוברת וילדה רצה בה מתכפר רצה בוולדה מתכפר לייתי בהמה מעוברת וימתין לה עד שתלד ולייתי שמונים בהדה ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הא וולדה תודה היא והא שמונים דתרווייהו ואי הך דקיימא תודה היא הא נמי תודה היא והא שמונים דתרווייהו הוא והאי ליהוי מותר דתודה Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If one separated a pregnant animal as a sin offering and it gave birth, if he wants he can achieve atonement with it, and if he wants he can achieve atonement with its offspring; then let the owner bring a pregnant animal and wait until it gives birth, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then this and its offspring are thanks offerings, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this mother should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them, and let this offspring be the leftover of the thanks offering.

אמר ליה מאן לימא לן דאמר רבי יוחנן אם שיירו משוייר דלמא אם שיירו אינו משוייר והיינו טעמא דרבי יוחנן דאמר אדם מתכפר בשבח הקדש Rav Kahana said to him: Who shall say to us that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he said that the offspring is considered the property of the one who dedicated the pregnant mother, such that if he reserved it for a specific consecration it is considered reserved for that consecration? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal separated as a sin offering, as he said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, such as the offspring of an animal that was consecrated when pregnant.

רבינא איקלע לדמהוריא אמר ליה רב דימי בריה דרב הונא מדמהוריא לרבינא ולייתי בהמה ולימא הרי עלי ולייתי בהמה אחריתי ולייתי שמונים בהדה ולימא אי הך דקיימא תמורה היא הני תרתי תודות והא שמונים דתרוייהו ואי הך דקיימא תודה היא והא דאמרי עלי נמי ליהוי תודה והא שמונים דתרוייהו ואידך תהוי לאחריות Ravina happened to come to Dimhorya. Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna from Dimhorya, said to Ravina: And let the owner bring an animal and say: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal for a thanks offering, and let him separate this animal in fulfillment of his vow, and then let him bring another animal, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then these two additional animals are thanks offerings and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this one for which I said: It is incumbent upon me, should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves are for both of them, and let the other animal be for a guarantee, to be sacrificed if my thanks offering gets lost, and it does not require loaves.

אמר ליה התורה אמרה (קהלת ה, ד) טוב אשר לא תדור משתדור ולא תשלם ואת אמרת ליקום ולינדור בתחילה: Ravina said to him: The Torah said: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4), and you say: Let him rise up and vow ab initio? Taking a vow to bring an offering is not encouraged. As all possible remedies have been rejected, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, that there is no remedy in a case where a thanks offering and its substitute were intermingled and one of them died, stands.

מתני׳ האומר הרי עלי תודה יביא היא ולחמה מן החולין MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred money in his possession and not second-tithe money. Since he said: It is incumbent upon me, bringing the offering is an obligation, and one may not fulfill an obligation with second-tithe money.

תודה עלי מן החולין ולחמה מן המעשר יביא היא ולחמה מן החולין תודה מן המעשר ולחמה מן החולין יביא היא ולחמה מן המעשר יביא ולא יביא מחיטי מעשר שני אלא ממעות מעשר שני: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.

גמ׳ אמר רב הונא האומר הרי עלי לחמי תודה מביא תודה ולחמה מאי טעמא מידע ידע האי גברא דלחם בלא תודה לא איקריב והאי תודה ולחמה קאמר והאי דקאמר לחמי תודה סוף מילתא נקט GEMARA: With regard to the various ways in which one can take a vow to bring a thanks offering and its loaves, Rav Huna says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves, even though he did not expressly take upon himself the obligation to bring the thanks offering itself. What is the reason? This man knows that loaves are not brought without a thanks offering, and by stating the vow in this manner, he was effectively saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves. And the reason he stated his vow in this manner, namely, by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, was that he was citing the end of the matter, as the sacrifice of a thanks offering is completed with the bringing of the loaves.

תנן תודה מן המעשר ולחמה מן החולין יביא כמה שנדר ואמאי כיון דאמר לחמה מן החולין יביא היא ולחמה מן החולין The Gemara raises a difficulty with the statement of Rav Huna from that which we learned in the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it as he vowed. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Huna that one who takes a vow to bring the loaves of a thanks offering intends to bring the thanks offering as well, why does the mishna state that he may bring the thanks offering from second-tithe money? Since he said: Its loaves from non-sacred money, he should bring a thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money.

שאני התם דכיון דאמר תודה מן המעשר נעשה כאומר הרי עלי לחם לפטור תודתו של פלוני The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the mishna, as since he said initially: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money, and then said: And its loaves from non-sacred money, he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves to exempt the thanks offering of so-and-so. His vow to bring the loaves is not considered a new vow, but rather as a vow to bring loaves for the specific offering he vowed to bring.

אי הכי רישא דקתני תודה מן החולין ולחמה מן המעשר יביא היא ולחמה מן החולין הכא נמי נעשה כאומר הרי עלי תודה לפטור לחמו של פלוני The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, then he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money, here too let it be said that he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering to exempt the loaves of so-and-so, and he therefore should bring a thanks offering from second tithe. His initial vow to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money should not include the bringing of the loaves.

הכי השתא בשלמא לחם למיפטר תודה אתי תודה למיפטר לחם מי אתיא The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, it can be said that he intends that the loaves should be brought to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring a thanks offering, because loaves come to exempt the thanks offering. But in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, it cannot be said that the thanks offering is meant to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, as does a thanks offering come to exempt the loaves?

תא שמע האומר הרי עלי תודה בלא לחם וזבח בלא נסכים כופין אותו ומביא תודה ולחמה זבח ונסכים The Gemara continues to discuss the statement of Rav Huna that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves. Come and hear a proof from a baraita that contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or an animal offering without libations, the court coerces him, and he brings a thanks offering with its loaves, or an offering with its libations.

טעמא דאמר אבל לא אמר תודה לא The Gemara infers: The reason that he is coerced to bring a thanks offering with its loaves is that he said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering. But if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but instead said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, he would not be coerced to bring a thanks offering with the loaves, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Huna.

הוא הדין אף על גב דלא אמר תודה ואיידי דקא בעי למיתנא זבח בלא נסכים דלא מתני ליה נסכים בלא זבח תנא נמי תודה The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the same is true even if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but said only: It is incumbent upon me to bring the loaves. And this is the reason that the tanna of the baraita mentions specifically the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering without loaves: Since the tanna wants to teach the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring an animal offering without libations, concerning which he could not teach a case where one renders himself obligated to bring libations without an offering, because, unlike the loaves of a thanks offering, libations are in fact brought on their own and one can take a vow to bring them on their own, he therefore also taught the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering.

אמאי נדר ופתחו עמו הוא The Gemara addresses the actual statement of the baraita and asks: Why is he coerced to bring a thanks offering and its loaves? Isn’t this an instance of a vow with its inherent opening? That is, the vow should be dissolved entirely on the grounds that the one who took the vow may claim that he thought it was possible to bring a thanks offering without loaves, and now that he has been made aware that he cannot, he regrets taking the vow.

אמר חזקיה הא מני בית שמאי היא דאמרי תפוס לשון הראשון דתנן הריני נזיר מן הגרוגרות ומן הדבלה בית שמאי אומרים נזיר ובית הלל אומרים אינו נזיר Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend to only the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (Nazir 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.

רבי יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא בית הלל באומר אילו הייתי יודע שאין נודרין כך לא הייתי נודר כך אלא כך ומאי כופין דקא בעי הדר ביה Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the ruling of the baraita is with regard to one who says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner, i.e., to bring a thanks offering without loaves or an animal offering without libations, I would not have vowed in this manner but in that manner, i.e., I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves. There is therefore no opening for a dissolution. And what does the baraita mean when it states that the court coerces him? Why would he require coercion if he says that he would have willingly taken the proper vow? The baraita is referring to a case where, despite the fact that he would have taken the proper vow initially, he now wants to retract his vow altogether.

תא שמע האומר הרי עלי תודה בלא לחם וזבח בלא נסכים ואמרו לו הבא תודה ולחמה וזבח ונסכים ואומר אילו הייתי יודע שכן לא הייתי נודר כופין אותו ואומר לו (דברים יב, כח) שמור ושמעת The Gemara cites a baraita in support of the response of Ḥizkiyya: Come and hear: In a case involving one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal offering without libations, and the Sages said to him: Bring a thanks offering with its loaves, or: Bring an animal offering with its libations, and he says: Had I known that such is the requirement I would not have vowed at all; the halakha is that the court coerces him, and says to him: “Observe and hear” (Deuteronomy 12:28).

בשלמא לחזקיה ניחא ליה אלא לר' יוחנן קשיא אמר לך ר' יוחנן הא ודאי בית שמאי היא The Gemara continues: Granted, this works out well according to Ḥizkiyya, who says that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one attends only to the first statement, since this baraita can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the baraita discusses a case where the person who took the vow says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves, this baraita presents a difficulty, as although the individual claims that he would not have taken any vow, he must still bring a thanks offering and its loaves. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: This latter baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, but the previous baraita may still be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

מאי שמור ושמעת אמר אביי שמור הבא תודה ושמעת הבא לחמה רבא אמר שמור הבא תודה ולחמה ושמעת שלא תהא רגיל לעשות כן The Gemara turns to analyze the baraita itself: What is the relevance of the phrase in the verse that says: “Observe and hear,” to one who vows to bring a thanks offering without its loaves? Abaye says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering; “and hear” means: Bring its loaves. Rava says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering and its loaves; “and hear” means that you should not act in this manner regularly.

(תודה) היא ולחמה מן המעשר יביא יביא לא סגי דלא מייתי רב נחמן ורב חסדא אמרי רצה מביא לא רצה לא יביא § The mishna teaches that if one states: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he shall bring it in that manner. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: He shall bring, which suggests that he must bring the thanks offering and loaves from second-tithe money? Is it not sufficient to fulfill his vow even if he does not bring it from second-tithe money but from non-sacred money? In fact, it is preferable that he bring the offering from non-sacred money. Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda say: The mishna does not mean that he must bring it specifically from second-tithe money; rather, if he wants, he brings it from second-tithe money, and if he does not want, he does not need to bring it from second-tithe money.

ולא יביא מחיטי מעשר שני אלא ממעות מעשר שני רב נחמן ורב חסדא דאמרי תרוייהו לא שנו אלא מחיטי מעשר שני אבל מחיטין הלקוחות ממעות מעשר שני יביא § The mishna teaches: And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money. With regard to this, Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased with second-tithe money.

יתיב רבי ירמיה קמיה דרבי זירא ויתיב וקאמר לא שנו אלא מחיטי מעשר שני אבל מחיטין הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני יביא אמר ליה רבי אתה אומר כן אני אומר אפילו מחיטין הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני לא יביא ואימא טעמא דידי ואימא טעמא דידך אימא טעמא דידך תודה מהיכא קא ילפת לה משלמים The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, and he was sitting and saying: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. Rabbi Zeira said to him: My teacher, do you say so? I say that he may not bring the loaves even from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. And I will say my reasoning and I will say your reasoning. I will say your reasoning first: From where do you derive that the loaves of a thanks offering may be brought from wheat purchased with second-tithe money? You derive it from the halakha of a peace offering. A thanks offering is a type of peace offering, as the verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:15), and a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money.

ושלמים שם שם ממעשר [ומינה] מה שלמים אין גופן מעשר אף תודה נמי אין גופה מעשר והני חיטי הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני נמי אין גופן מעשר And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from the verse discussing second tithe. The verse states with regard to a peace offering: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and you shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7), and the verse states with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23). And from this it may be concluded: Just as peace offerings are not themselves brought from second tithe, as they are not produce, so too with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, they are not themselves brought from second tithe. And that wheat which is purchased with second-tithe money is also not itself second tithe; it may therefore be used for the loaves of the thanks offering.

אימא טעמא דידי תודה מהיכא קא ילפינא לה משלמים ושלמים שם שם ממעשר מה שלמים אין מין מעשר אף תודה אין מין מעשר לאפוקי חיטין הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני דמין מעשר נינהו Now I will say my reasoning for why one may not prepare the loaves of a thanks offering with wheat that was purchased with second-tithe money: From where do I derive the halakha that a thanks offering may be brought from second-tithe money? I derive it from the halakhot of a peace offering. And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from second tithe. Therefore, just as a peace offering is not of the same species as second tithe, so too the loaves of a thanks offering may not be of the same species as second tithe. This serves to exclude wheat purchased with second-tithe money, which is of the same species as second tithe.

אמר ר' אמי המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים לא קנו שלמים מאי טעמא דלא אלימא קדושת השלמים למיחל אקדושת מעשר שני § Rabbi Ami says: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the money does not assume the status of a peace offering. What is the reason? The reason is that the sanctity of the peace offering is not strong enough to take effect upon items that have the sanctity of second tithe.

מיתיבי הלוקח חיה לזבחי שלמים ובהמה לבשר תאוה לא יצא העור לחולין לאו למימרא דקני שלמים The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 1:4): Ideally, one should use second-tithe money to purchase peace offerings. If one purchases a peace offering with second-tithe money, only the flesh of the animal is consecrated, while its hide is non-sacred. The mishna teaches: With regard to one who uses second-tithe money in an improper manner and purchases an undomesticated animal for a peace offering, a purpose for which an undomesticated animal cannot be used, or purchases a domesticated animal for meat of desire, i.e., ordinary meat, the Sages penalized him and decreed that the hide does not become non-sacred. The Gemara asks: Is that not to say that the hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money assumes the status of a peace offering, and it must be sold and the money used to purchase a peace offering, in contradiction to the statement of Rabbi Ami?

הא איתמר עלה אמר רב לא קני שלמים ומאי לא יצא העור לחולין הכי קאמר אינו בתורת לצאת העור לחולין מאי טעמא אמר רבה נעשה כלוקח שור לחרישה The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t it stated concerning that mishna that Rav said: The hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money does not assume the status of a peace offering; and what is the meaning of the mishna that the hide does not become non-sacred? This is what the mishna is saying: The hide, as part of an undomesticated animal, is not in the category of a peace offering at all so that its hide would become non-sacred. What is the reason? Rabba says: Since he used the second-tithe money in an improper manner, it is considered as if he purchased an ox for plowing, to which no sanctity of second tithe applies.

איתמר המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים ר' יוחנן אמר קני רבי אלעזר אומר לא קני § It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The money assumes the status of a peace offering, and Rabbi Elazar says: The money does not assume the status of a peace offering.

ואליבא דר' יהודה דאמר מעשר ממון הדיוט הוא דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דקני כי פליגי אליבא דר' מאיר דאמר מעשר ממון גבוה הוא מאן דאמר לא קני כר' מאיר ומאן דאמר קני כיון דמעשר קרי ליה שלמים כי מיתפסת ליה נמי תפיס The Gemara elaborates: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Second tithe is non-sacred property, everyone agrees that the money assumes the status of a peace offering. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Second tithe is property belonging to the Most High. The one who says that the money does not assume the status of a peace offering holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and one may not designate property of the Most High for another purpose. And the one who says that the money assumes the status of a peace offering holds that since second tithe is called a peace offering, as an animal purchased with second-tithe money without specification is brought as a peace offering, when he designates the money for a peace offering, it as well is designated with the sanctity of a peace offering.

מיתיבי המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים כשהוא פודן מוסיף עליהם שני חומשין אחד לקדש ואחד למעשר The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the sanctity of a peace offering is applied to this money in addition to the sanctity of second tithe. Therefore, when he redeems this money, he adds to it two-fifths: One-fifth for the redemption of the sacrificial sanctity of a peace offering and one-fifth for the redemption of second tithe. Evidently, the sanctity of a peace offering does take effect on second-tithe money.

מי סברת דברי הכל היא הא מני רבי יהודה היא: The Gemara responds: Do you maintain that this baraita is agreed upon by everyone? In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second-tithe money is non-sacred property. Accordingly, the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect on the money. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

מתני׳ מנין לאומר הרי עלי תודה שלא יביא אלא מן החולין תלמוד לומר (דברים טז, ב) וזבחת פסח לה' אלהיך צאן ובקר והלא פסח אין בא אלא מן הכבשים ומן העזים אם כן מה תלמוד לומר צאן ובקר להקיש כל הבא מן הצאן ומן הבקר לפסח מה פסח דבר שבחובה ואין בא אלא מן החולין אף כל דבר שבחובה אין בא אלא מן החולין MISHNA: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, that he may bring it only from non-sacred money? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). The verse is difficult: Doesn’t the Paschal offering come only from lambs and goats? If so, why does the verse state: “The flock and the herd”? It is to juxtapose all offerings that come from the flock and from the herd to the Paschal offering, teaching that just as the Paschal offering is a matter of obligation and comes only from non-sacred money, so too any matter of obligation comes only from non-sacred money.

לפיכך האומר הרי עלי תודה הרי עלי שלמים הואיל ובאין חובה לא יביאו אלא מן החולין ונסכים בכל מקום לא יביאו אלא מן החולין: Therefore, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a peace offering, since these offerings come as an obligation due to his vow, they may be brought only from non-sacred money. And libations, in any case, may be brought only from non-sacred money, and not from second-tithe money, because second-tithe money must be used to purchase items eaten by people, while libations are poured out next to the altar.

גמ׳ ופסח גופיה מנא לן דתניא ר' אליעזר אומר נאמר פסח במצרים ונאמר פסח לדורות מה פסח האמור במצרים לא בא אלא מן החולין אף פסח האמור לדורות לא בא אלא מן החולין GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the halakha that any matter of obligation must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering. The Gemara asks: And concerning the Paschal offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred property? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: “Paschal offering” is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering sacrificed in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3), and “Paschal offering” is stated with regard to the yearly obligation throughout the generations (see Exodus 12:25). Therefore, just as the Paschal offering stated with regard to Egypt was brought only from non-sacred property, as there was no second tithe in Egypt, so too the Paschal offering stated with regard to the obligation throughout the generations may be brought only from non-sacred property.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא וכי דנין אפשר משאי אפשר אמר לו אף על פי שאי אפשר ראייה גדולה היא ונלמד הימנה Rabbi Akiva said to him: But does one derive the possible from the impossible? Does one derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, when there exists the possibility of using second-tithe money, from the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt, when there was no second tithe? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Even though it was impossible to bring the Paschal offering in Egypt from consecrated money, it is a great proof, and we shall derive this halakha from it.

חזר רבי עקיבא ודנו דין אחר מה לפסח מצרים שכן אין טעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח Rabbi Akiva then presented a different logical derivation to reject the proof of Rabbi Eliezer: One cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from that of the Paschal offering in Egypt, as what is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar.

תאמר בפסח דורות שטעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

אמר לו הרי הוא אומר (שמות יג, ה) ועבדת את העבודה הזאת בחדש הזה שיהיו כל עבודות של חודש הזה כזה Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Paschal offerings should be compared, as the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “And it shall be when the Lord shall bring you into the land of the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Amorite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, which He swore to your fathers to give you, a land flowing with milk and honey, that you shall perform this service in this month” (Exodus 13:5). This indicates that all the services of this month for the generations shall be like this, the Paschal offering of Egypt.

ור' עקיבא אי סבר לה דאין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ליקו במילתיה The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: Initially, Rabbi Akiva rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer based on the claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. He then rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer on a technicality, namely that the two Paschal offerings have different sacrificial requirements. The Gemara therefore challenges: And as for Rabbi Akiva, if he holds that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, then let him stand by his statement.

אי הדר ביה והאי דלא גמר מפסח מצרים משום האי פירכא הוא פסח מדבר יוכיח And if he retracted and conceded that one derives the possible from the impossible, and the fact that he did not derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt is due to that refutation that he proposed, i.e., that the Paschal offerings are different, then the Paschal offering that was sacrificed in the second year in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect. That offering did require placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money, as there were no tithes in the wilderness.

לדבריו דר' אליעזר קאמר לדידי אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר לדידך דאמרת דנין אפשר משאי אפשר מה לפסח מצרים שכן אינו טעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח תאמר בפסח דורות שטעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח The Gemara explains: Rabbi Akiva stated this objection in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. He meant as follows: According to my opinion, one does not derive the possible from the impossible, and this is a sufficient reason why one cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt. And even according to your opinion, in which you said that one derives the possible from the impossible, this comparison can be refuted: What is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar. Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

ואמר ליה רבי אליעזר ועבדת And in response to this, Rabbi Eliezer said to him that the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations should be derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt, since the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “That you shall keep this service in this month.”

ורבי אליעזר לימא ליה פסח מדבר יוכיח The Gemara asks: But why must Rabbi Eliezer cite this verse? Let him say to Rabbi Akiva: The Paschal offering brought in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect, since it did require placement of the blood and consumption of sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money.

לדבריו דרבי עקיבא קאמר ליה לדידי דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ומשום האי פירכא פסח מדבר יוכיח לדידך דאמרת אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ועבדת The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva. He meant as follows: In my opinion, one derives the possible from the impossible. And as for that refutation that you raised, that the Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations have different sacrificial requirements, the Paschal offering of the wilderness will prove that this is not a valid refutation. According to your opinion, in which you said that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, the verse states: “That you shall keep this service in this month,” indicating that the Paschal offering of the generations is compared to the Paschal offering in Egypt.

והשתא נמי ליפרוך אמר רב ששת זאת אומרת אין משיבין על ההיקש The Gemara challenges: But even now, let Rabbi Akiva refute this comparison by the same claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. Rav Sheshet says: That is to say that one cannot refute a juxtaposition, i.e., one cannot refute such a derivation based on reasoning.

ובתרביצא אמור וכי דבר הלמד בהיקש חוזר ומלמד בהיקש בכללא איתמר פסח כוליה חדא מילתא היא And in the study hall [uvetarbitza] they discussed the statement of the mishna that the halakha that all obligatory offerings must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the Paschal offering of the generations, and they said: But can a matter derived via juxtaposition, i.e., the Paschal offering of the generations, whose halakha is derived by juxtaposition from the Paschal offering in Egypt, again teach a matter via another juxtaposition? The Gemara responds: This is not considered an instance of a matter derived by juxtaposition teaching a matter derived by another juxtaposition. Rather, the statement of the mishna that all offerings are juxtaposed to the Paschal offering was stated in a general manner, since the entire Paschal offering is one matter. The Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations are both referred to as a Paschal offering.

ורבי עקיבא פסח דאינו בא אלא מן החולין מנא ליה נפקא ליה מהא דאמר שמואל משום ר' אליעזר (ויקרא ז, לז) זאת התורה לעולה ולמנחה ולחטאת ולאשם ולמילואים ולזבח השלמים The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who rejects the proofs of Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive that the Paschal offering comes only from non-sacred money? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva derives it from that which Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It is stated: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.

עולה מה עולה טעונה כלי אף כל טעון כלי מאי היא אילימא מזרק גבי זבחי שלמי ציבור נמי כתיב (שמות כד, ו) וישם באגנות The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states: “Of the burnt offering,” to teach that all of the offerings are like a burnt offering in that just as a burnt offering requires a utensil in its preparation, so too do all animal offerings require a utensil. What is the utensil? If we say it is a bowl, a utensil used for collecting the blood, as is learned from the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, as a utensil for collecting blood does not need to be learned from a burnt offering. With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written: “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings…And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins” (Exodus 24:5–6).

אלא סכין ועולה גופה מנלן דכתיב (בראשית כב, י) וישלח אברהם את ידו ויקח את המאכלת לשחוט את בנו והתם עולה הוא דכתיב (בראשית כב, יג) ויעלהו לעולה תחת בנו Rather, the term utensil must be referring to a knife, as the slaughter may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: And with regard to a burnt offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); and there, Abraham was sacrificing a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son” (Genesis 22:13).

מנחה מה מנחה אינה נאכלת אלא לזכרי כהונה אף כל אין נאכלין אלא לזכרי כהונה מאי אי חטאת ואשם The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions a meal offering, it teaches that just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood (see Leviticus 6:9–11), so too are all of the offerings mentioned in this verse eaten only by males of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: With regard to what offering is it that this halakha must be derived? If one suggests that it is with regard to the sin offering and the guilt offering,

בהדיא כתיב this halakha is explicitly written of them. With regard to the sin offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), and with regard to the guilt offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:6).

אי זבחי שלמי ציבור מרבויא דקראי אתי (במדבר יח, י) בקדש הקדשים תאכלנו כל זכר (בכהנים) יאכל אותו לימד על זבחי שלמי ציבור שאין נאכלים אלא לזכרי כהונה If one suggests that the halakha must be derived with regard to communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs that were sacrificed as communal offerings on Shavuot together with the offering of the two loaves (see Leviticus 23:19), this halakha is derived from the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings. The verse states: “In a most sacred place shall you eat of it; every male may eat it” (Numbers 18:10), and it is taught in a baraita: The verse teaches with regard to communal peace offerings that they are eaten only by males of priestly families.

תנאי היא איכא דמייתי לה מהכא ואיכא דמייתי לה מהכא The Gemara explains: It is a dispute between tanna’im. There is one tanna who cites it, the halakha that only males of priestly families may eat of the communal peace offering, from here, i.e., the precedent mentioned explicitly with regard to the meal offering; and there is one tanna who cites it from there, i.e., the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings.

חטאת מה חטאת מקדשה בבלוע אף כל מקדשה בבלוע The Gemara continues expounding the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings.” “Sin offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a sin offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.

אשם מה אשם אין שפיר ושליא קדוש בו אף כל אין שפיר ושליא קדוש בו קסבר ולדות קדשים בהוייתן הן קדושים ודנין אפשר משאי אפשר “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred within it, because a guilt offering is always male and as such never holds a fetal sac or a placenta, so too for any of the offerings mentioned in the verse, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred if found within it. The Gemara notes: Evidently, this tanna holds that with regard to offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the moment of their births, but not in utero. And he also holds that one derives the possible from the impossible, so that the halakha of a fetal sac and a placenta in the case of female animals may be derived from the halakha of a male animal.

מלואים מה מלואים מותריהן בשריפה ואין בעלי חיים מותריהן בשריפה אף כל מותריהן בשריפה ואין בעלי חיים מותריהן בשריפה “Inauguration offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the inauguration offering, the rams and the bread of which were brought during the seven days of inauguration of the Tabernacle and which the priests ate, their leftovers were disposed of by incineration, as is stated: “And if any of the flesh of the inauguration offering, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder with fire” (Exodus 29:34), and there were no living animals counted among their leftovers disposed of by incineration, so too for all offerings mentioned, their leftovers are disposed of by incineration, and there are no living animals counted among their leftovers disposed of by incineration. Accordingly, if one sanctifies two animals so that either one may be brought if the other is lost, when one animal is sacrificed, the surviving animal is not killed and incinerated.

שלמים מה שלמים מפגלין ומתפגלין אף כל מפגלין ומתפגלין “Peace offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the peace offering, its components may render components of the offering piggul and are rendered piggul, so too with regard to all offerings mentioned in this verse, their components render components of the offering piggul and are rendered piggul.

במתניתא תנא משמיה דר' עקיבא (ויקרא ז, לז) זאת התורה כו' מנחה מה מנחה מקדשת בבלוע אף כל מקדשת בבלוע § It was taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Akiva that the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). From the term “meal offering” it is derived: Just as with regard to a meal offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, as it is stated: “Whatever shall touch them shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:11), so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.

ואיצטריך למכתב בחטאת ואיצטריך למכתב במנחה דאי כתב רחמנא במנחה משום דרכיכא בלעה אבל חטאת אימא לא ואי כתב רחמנא בחטאת משום דבשר אגב דשמן קדיר אבל מנחה אימא לא צריכא The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to write the halakha of absorption with regard to a sin offering, and it was necessary to write the halakha of absorption with regard to a meal offering. As, had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a meal offering, I would say that since it is soft, it is absorbed and therefore sanctifies what it touches; but with regard to the meat of a sin offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. And had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a sin offering, I would say that it is because, on account of its fattiness, the meat penetrates [kadeir] into whatever it touches and sanctifies it; but with regard to a meal offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to write both.

חטאת מה חטאת אינה באה אלא מן החולין וביום ובידו הימנית אף כל אינו בא אלא מן החולין וביום ובידו הימנית The cited baraita continues: “Sin offering” teaches: Just as a sin offering is brought only from non-sacred animals, and it is sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and its service must be performed with the priest’s right hand, so too all offerings mentioned are brought only from non-sacred animals, and are sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and each one’s service must be performed with the priest’s right hand.

וחטאת גופה מנלן אמר ר' חסדא דאמר קרא (ויקרא טז, ו) והקריב אהרן את פר החטאת אשר לו לו משלו ולא משל מעשר And with regard to a sin offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred animals? Rav Ḥisda said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And Aaron shall present the bull of the sin offering, which is his” (Leviticus 16:11). This teaches that the animal must come from his cattle, and not from money with which the second tithe has been redeemed.

ביום (ויקרא ז, לח) מביום צוותו נפקא כדי נסבה The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive from the halakha of a sin offering that an offering is sacrificed in the daytime? Isn’t this principle derived from the expression: “On the day of His commanding” (Leviticus 7:38), which is understood to be referring to all offerings? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the baraita cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason [kedi], and it was mentioned here on account of the other principles.

בידו הימנית מדרבה בר בר חנה נפקא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ריש לקיש כל מקום שנאמר אצבע וכהונה אינו אלא ימין כדי נסבה The Gemara asks: Why must the baraita teach that the halakha of the sin offering teaches that the rites of offerings must be performed with the priest’s right hand? Isn’t this derived from the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana? As Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In any place in the Torah that it is stated that an action is performed with a finger, or that it is performed by priesthood, the halakha is that the rite is performed only with the right hand. This is derived from the Torah’s statement with regard to the leper: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). The Gemara answers: The baraita cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason, since it is actually derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement.

אשם מה אשם עצמותיו מותרין אף כל עצמותיו מותרין The cited baraita continues: “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, its bones have no sanctity and are permitted for any use, so too with regard to any mentioned offering, its bones are permitted.

ור' עקיבא האי (דברים טז, ב) וזבחת פסח The mishna teaches that the verse that states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2), indicates by juxtaposition that every obligatory offering, like the Paschal offering, may be brought only from non-sacred money. The Gemara therefore asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who derives this from the verse: “This is the law of…the sin offering,” that verse: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering,”

מאי עביד ליה מבעי ליה לכדרב נחמן דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה מנין למותר הפסח שקרב שלמים שנאמר (דברים טז, ב) וזבחת פסח לה' אלהיך צאן ובקר והלא אין פסח בא אלא מן הכבשים ומן העזים אלא מותר הפסח יהא לדבר הבא מן הצאן ומן הבקר what does he make of it, i.e., what does he derive from it? He requires it for that which was stated by Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.” The verse is difficult: But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the sheep and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd, i.e., a peace offering.

והא מהכא נפקא מדאבוה דשמואל נפקא דכתיב (ויקרא ג, ו) אם מן הצאן קרבנו לזבח שלמים ואמר אבוה דשמואל דבר הבא מן הצאן יהא לזבח שלמים The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites: As it is written: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6); and Shmuel’s father said: This teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.

ואכתי מהכא נפקא מהתם נפקא והתניא כבש לרבות את הפסח לאליה But still it must be asked: Is it derived from here? It is derived from there, from the verse cited in the following baraita. And isn’t it taught in a baraita: Even though the verse already states that peace offerings come from the flock, as it is written: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock, male or female, he shall sacrifice it without blemish” (Leviticus 3:6), the verse goes on to specify: “If he bring a lamb for his offering…and if his offering be a goat” (Leviticus 3:7–12). The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the fat tail be sacrificed on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this halakha is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.

כשהוא אומר אם כבש להביא פסח שעברה שנתו ושלמים הבאים מחמת פסח לכל מצות שלמים שיטענו סמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושוק The baraita continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh.

כשהוא אומר ואם עז הפסיק הענין לימד על העז שאינה טעונה אליה And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrifice of a goat does not require that the fat tail be burned on the altar. In any event, the verse indicates that a Paschal offering that was disqualified as such because it has reached its second year, i.e., the leftover of a Paschal offering, is sacrificed as a peace offering. It may therefore be asked: Why are there three verses to indicate this one halakha?

תלתא קראי כתיב חד לעברה זמנו ועברה שנתו וחד לעברה זמנו ולא עברה שנתו וחד ללא עברה זמנו ולא עברה שנתו Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the halakha that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering. One verse teaches this halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the halakha in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.

וצריכי דאי אשמעינן עברה זמנו ועברה שנתו משום דאידחי ליה לגמרי אבל עברה זמנו ולא עברה שנתו דחזי לפסח שני אימא לא And all these verses are necessary. As had the Merciful One written only the case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed, one could say that only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering; but in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.

ואי אשמעינן עברה זמנו ולא עברה שנתו דאידחי ליה מפסח ראשון אבל לא עברה זמנו ולא עברה שנתו דאפילו לפסח ראשון נמי חזי אימא לא צריכא: And if the Torah had taught us only that a leftover Paschal offering whose time has passed but whose year has not passed is sacrificed as a peace offering, one might think that this is because the Paschal offering was rejected from the first Pesaḥ; but in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.

מתני׳ כל קרבנות הציבור והיחיד באין מן הארץ ומחוצה לארץ מן החדש ומן הישן חוץ מן העומר ושתי הלחם שאינן באין אלא מן החדש ומן הארץ MISHNA: All communal and individual meal offerings may come from produce grown in Eretz Yisrael and from outside Eretz Yisrael, from the new crop, i.e., the current year’s crop, and from the old crop from previous years. This is the halakha of all meal offerings except for the omer, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the two loaves, i.e., the communal offering brought on the festival of Shavuot, as they come only from the new crop and from Eretz Yisrael.

וכולן אינן באין אלא מן המובחר ואיזהו מובחר שלהם מכניס וזטחא אלפא לסלת שנייה להן עפוריים בבקעה And all meal offerings come only from the optimal-quality grain. And which places have the optimal grain for them? Fields in Makhnis and Zateḥa are the primary [alfa] source for fine flour. Secondary to them is Aforayim in the valley.

כל הארצות היו כשרות אלא מכאן היו מביאין: All the regions were valid as the source of the grain, but it is from here, the primary and secondary places, that they would bring grain, because it was of optimal quality.

גמ׳ מתניתין דלא כי האי תנא דתניא עומר הבא מן הישן כשר שתי הלחם הבאות מן הישן כשרות אלא שחיסר מצוה GEMARA: The mishna states that the omer meal offering and the two loaves are prepared only from the new crop. The wording of the mishna indicates that this is an essential requirement. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: An omer meal offering that comes from the old crop is valid. Similarly, the two loaves that come from the old crop are valid, but by bringing them from the old crop one lacks the proper fulfillment of its mitzva.

עומר דכתיב (ויקרא ב, יד) תקריב את מנחת בכוריך ואפילו מן העלייה The Gemara provides the biblical sources for the rulings of the baraita: The source for the ruling concerning the omer meal offering is as it is written: “And when you shall bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, it is ripened grain, toasted over fire, even groats of the fresh ear, you shall bring the meal offering of your first fruits” (Leviticus 2:14). The superfluous repetition of the term “you shall bring” teaches that the omer is valid even if brought from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.

שתי הלחם דכתיב (ויקרא כג, יז) ממושבותיכם תביאו ולא מן חוצה לארץ ממושבותיכם ואפילו מן העלייה The source for the ruling concerning the two loaves is as it is written: “And you shall offer a new meal offering to the Lord. From your dwellings you shall bring two wave-loaves” (Leviticus 23:16–17). The term “your dwellings” is a reference to Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, the verse indicates that the two loaves must be brought from grain grown there, and not from outside of Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, the term “from your dwellings” teaches that the offering may come from any grain grown in Eretz Yisrael and even from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.

הא אפיקתיה אמר קרא תביאו ואפילו מן העלייה The Gemara asks how two halakhot can be derived from the same term: Didn’t you already expound that term to teach that one can use grain only if it is grown in Eretz Yisrael? How can you also derive from it that the grain can be brought from an old crop? The Gemara explains: That is derived from the next term, as the verse states: “From your dwellings you shall bring” (Leviticus 23:17), which teaches that one may bring them from any grain grown in Eretz Yisrael and even from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.

והאי מיבעי ליה שכל שאתה מביא ממקום אחר הרי הוא כזה אם כן ליכתוב קרא תביא מאי תביאו שמע מינה תרתי The Gemara questions this answer: But that term is necessary to teach that any leavened bread offering that you bring in another instance, i.e., the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, is to be like this offering of the two loaves, i.e., the same requirements apply to it (see 77b). How, then, can you expound the term to also teach that grain from an old crop can be used for the two loaves? The Gemara explains: If so, that the term is written only to teach about the requirements for other leavened bread offerings, then let the verse write: You shall bring [tavi], using the singular form. For what reason then, does it write: “You shall bring [tavi’u],” using the plural form? It is written so that one can learn from it two different halakhot.

והכתיב (ויקרא כג, י) ראשית למצוה The Gemara questions the ruling of the baraita that the omer and the two loaves are valid even if brought from an old crop: But isn’t the term “first” written with regard to both the omer and the two loaves? This indicates they must come from the new crop. The omer is referred to as “the first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), and the two loaves are referred to as “an offering of the first” (Leviticus 2:12). The Gemara answers: The term indicates that only the new crop should be used, but that is only for the proper fulfillment of the mitzva. If an old crop was used, the offerings are still valid.

הכתיב (ויקרא כג, טז) חדשה האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא רבי נתן ור' עקיבא אמרו שתי הלחם הבאות מן הישן כשרות ומה אני מקיים חדשה שתהא חדשה לכל המנחות The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the two loaves: “A new meal offering” (Leviticus 23:16), which indicates that only the new crop can be used? The fact that with regard to the two loaves the Torah repeats this requirement twice suggests that it is indispensable. The Gemara answers: The word “new” cannot teach that the use of the new crop is essential, as it is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Akiva said that even if the two loaves are brought from the old crop, they are valid. How do I realize the meaning of: “A new meal offering”? This teaches that the two loaves are to be the first of all the other meal offerings. No other meal offerings may be brought from the new crop until the meal offering of the two loaves has been brought.

עד כאן לא פליגי אלא בחדש § The Gemara defines the limits of the dispute between the mishna and baraita: They disagree only with regard to whether it is essential for the omer and the two loaves to be brought from the new crop.

אבל בארץ לא פליגי דעומר ושתי הלחם מארץ אין מחוצה לארץ לא But with regard to the requirement to use grain grown in Eretz Yisrael, they do not disagree that if the omer and the two loaves come from Eretz Yisrael, indeed, they are valid, but if they come from outside of Eretz Yisrael, they are not valid.

כמאן דלא כי האי תנא דתניא ר' יוסי בר רבי יהודה אומר עומר בא מחוצה לארץ ומה אני מקיים (ויקרא כג, י) כי תבאו אל הארץ שלא נתחייבו בעומר קודם שנכנסו לארץ In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that the omer may come from outside of Eretz Yisrael. How do I realize the meaning of the verse that introduces the obligation to bring the omer: “When you come into the land which I give to you” (Leviticus 23:10)? This verse appears to indicate that the bringing of the omer is restricted to Eretz Yisrael. That verse teaches that the Jewish people were not obligated in the mitzva of bringing the omer before they entered Eretz Yisrael.

וקסבר חדש בחוצה לארץ דאורייתא היא דכתיב ממושבותיכם כל מקום שאתם יושבין משמע וכי תבאו זמן ביאה היא וכיון דאורייתא היא אקרובי נמי מקריבין: The Gemara explains the basis of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: And he holds that even outside of Eretz Yisrael, consuming the new crop is prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “From all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:17), which indicates that the prohibition applies anywhere that you dwell, even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, the earlier verse, which introduces the prohibition with: “When you come into the land which I give to you” (Leviticus 23:10), is a reference to the time of the Jewish people entering Eretz Yisrael, and it indicates that the prohibition takes effect only from that time. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that the new crop outside of Eretz Yisrael is prohibited for consumption by Torah law, he consequently holds that one may also offer the omer from crops grown there.

תנן התם שומרי ספיחין בשביעית נוטלין שכרן מתרומת הלשכה § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Shekalim 4:1): The guards who are appointed by the court to protect some of the produce that grew without being purposely planted [sefiḥin] during the Sabbatical Year, in order that it can be used for the omer and the offering of the two loaves, collect their wages from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber.

רמי ליה רמי בר חמא לרב חסדא תנן שומרי ספיחין בשביעית נוטלין שכרן מתרומת הלשכה ורמינהו (ויקרא כה, ו) לאכלה ולא לשריפה Rami bar Ḥama raises a contradiction to Rav Ḥisda: We learned in that mishna that the guards of sefiḥin during the Sabbatical Year collect their wages from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. This indicates that even in the Sabbatical Year, the omer is brought from that year’s crop. And one can raise a contradiction to this from a baraita: The verse states: “And the Sabbatical Year of the land shall be for you for eating” (Leviticus 25:6), which indicates it is to be used for eating, but not for burning. Accordingly, since the omer is burned on the altar, it should not be brought from produce of the Sabbatical Year.

אמר ליה רחמנא אמר לך (ויקרא כג, יד) לדורותיכם ואת אמרת תיבטל Rav Ḥisda said to him: The Merciful One said to you about the omer: “It is a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 23:14), indicating that the mitzva can be fulfilled in all times, and you say the omer should be canceled in a Sabbatical Year?

אמר ליה ומי קאמינא אנא תיבטל לייתי מדאשתקד בעינא כרמל וליכא Rami bar Ḥama said to him: But am I saying that the omer should be canceled? Certainly not. Let one bring the omer from grain that sprouted during the previous year, concerning which there is no prohibition against burning it. Rav Ḥisda rejects this suggestion: But to fulfill the mitzva I require that the grain be of the “fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14), i.e., young grain, and this requirement is not fulfilled with grain that sprouted during the previous year, as it has already been growing a long time.

ולייתי מכרמל דאשתקד אמר קרא (ויקרא ב, יד) כרמל תקריב בעינא כרמל בשעת הקרבה וליכא Rami bar Ḥama persists: But let one bring the omer from the young grain that was cut during the harvest of the previous year, when it was still fresh. Rav Ḥisda rejects this suggestion: The verse states: “Fresh ear, you shall bring” (Leviticus 2:14). The juxtaposition of the mitzva to bring the grain with the requirement that it be young indicates that I need it to still be young grain at the time of offering it, and this condition is not fulfilled if one uses grain from the previous year’s harvest. Young grain is soft (see 66b), whereas grain that was reaped during the previous year would have become brittle.

איתמר רבי יוחנן אמר כרמל תקריב ר' אלעזר אומר ראשית קצירך ראשית קצירך ולא סוף קצירך § An amoraic dispute was stated concerning the source of the halakha that the omer may not be brought from the previous year’s crop: Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is derived from: “Fresh ear, you shall bring,” as Rav Ḥisda explains. Rabbi Elazar says it is derived from the fact that the omer is referred to as: “The first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), which indicates that the omer is brought only from the first of your harvest, i.e., from the first produce of the current year’s crop, and not from the last of your harvest, i.e., from produce taken from the remainder of the previous year’s crop.

מותיב רבה (ויקרא ב, יד) ואם תקריב מנחת בכורים במנחת העומר הכתוב מדבר מהיכן היא באה מן השעורים אתה אומר מן השעורים או אינו אלא מן החיטין Rabba raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, from a baraita: The verse states: “And when you shall bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:14). The verse is speaking of the omer meal offering. From which type of grain does it come? It comes from barley. Do you say that it comes from barley, or does it come only from wheat?

רבי אליעזר אומר נאמר (שמות ט, לא) אביב במצרים ונאמר (ויקרא ב, יד) אביב לדורות מה אביב האמור במצרים שעורים אף אביב האמור לדורות אינו בא אלא מן השעורים Rabbi Eliezer says that it is stated “in the ear,” with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt: “And the flax and the barley were smitten; for the barley was in the ear, and the flax was in bloom” (Exodus 9:31), and it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the mitzva of the new crop, which is for all generations. Just as the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt is referring to barley, as is clear from the next verse: “But the wheat and the spelt were not smitten; for they ripen late” (Exodus 9:32), so too the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the new crop for all generations is referring to barley.

רבי עקיבא אומר מצינו יחיד שמביא חובתו מן החיטין ומביא חובתו מן השעורין ואף ציבור מביא חובתו מן החיטין ומביא חובתו מן השעורין אם אתה אומר מן החיטין לא מצינו ציבור שמביא חובתו מן השעורין The baraita cites another proof that the omer offering is brought from barley. And Rabbi Akiva says: We found an individual who brings his obligation of a meal offering from wheat, which is brought by a poor person for a false oath of testimony, a false oath of utterance, or for entering the Temple while ritually impure, and one who brings his obligation of a meal offering from barley, in the case of a sinner’s meal offering or the meal offering of a sota. And we also found with regard to the community that they bring their obligation of a meal offering from wheat, in the case of the two loaves offering of Shavuot, and therefore, to keep the halakha of the offering of a community parallel to that of an individual there should be a case where the community brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. And if you say that the omer offering comes from wheat, then we will not have found a case of a community that brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. Consequently, it must be that the omer offering comes from barley.

דבר אחר אם אתה אומר עומר בא מן החיטין אין שתי הלחם ביכורים אלמא משום ביכורים הוא תיובתא Rabbi Akiva suggests another proof: Alternatively, if you say that the omer offering comes from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be brought from the first fruits. The verse states that the two loaves offering of Shavuot should come from the first fruits: “Also in the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord in your feast of weeks” (Numbers 28:26). If the omer is from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be the first offering of the first fruit, as the omer offering of Passover precedes it. Therefore, the omer offering must come from barley. Rabba explains the objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Evidently, the omer offering is brought from the new crop because the grain used is referred to as first fruits, i.e., “the first of your harvest.” The Gemara concludes: This baraita is a conclusive refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.

תנן התם אין מביאין ביכורים חוץ משבעת המינין ולא § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Bikkurim 1:3): One may bring first fruits only from the seven species with which Eretz Yisrael is praised in the verse: “A land of wheat and barley, vines, figs and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey” (Deuteronomy 8:8). But one may not

מתמרים שבהרים ולא מפירות שבעמקים אמר עולא אם הביא לא קידש bring them from dates that grow in the mountains, and one may not bring them from produce that grows in the valleys. Such produce is of inferior quality and may not be used. Ulla says: Even if one did bring such produce, he does not thereby consecrate it, i.e., it does not attain the consecrated status of first fruits.

יתיב רבה וקא אמר לה להא שמעתא איתיביה רבי אחא בר אבא לרבה (ויקרא ב, יב) קרבן ראשית שתהא ראשית לכל המנחות וכן הוא אומר (במדבר כח, כו) בהקריבכם מנחה חדשה לה' בשבועותיכם Rabba sat in the study hall and stated this halakha. Rabbi Aḥa bar Abba raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita: The Torah refers to the two loaves offering as: “A first offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11), which indicates that it is to be the first of all the meal offerings that come from the new crop. And similarly the verse states with regard to the festival of Shavuot: “On the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord” (Numbers 28:26). By designating the two loaves as “new,” the verse indicates that they should be brought from the first of the new crop.

אין לי אלא חדשה של חטים חדשה של שעורים מנין תלמוד לומר חדשה חדשה אם אינו ענין לחדשה של חיטין תנהו ענין לחדשה של שעורים I have derived only that it must be new, i.e., the first, of all wheat meal offerings. From where do I derive that it must also be new, i.e., the first, of all barley meal offerings, e.g., the meal offering of a sota? With regard to the two loaves, the verse states the word “new,” and again states the word “new,” once in Numbers 28:26 and again in Leviticus 23:16. If the second mention is not needed to teach the matter of being the new meal offering of wheat, apply it to the matter of being the new meal offering of barley.

ומנין שתהא קודמת לביכורים תלמוד לומר (שמות לד, כב) וחג שבעות תעשה לך בכורי קציר חטים ואין לי אלא בכורי קציר חטים קציר שעורים מנין תלמוד לאמר (שמות כג, טז) וחג הקציר בכורי מעשיך אשר תזרע בשדה The baraita continues: And from where is it derived that the two loaves precede the bringing of the first fruits as well? The verse states: “And you shall make for yourself a festival of Shavuot, the first fruits of the wheat harvest” (Exodus 34:22). The order of the verse teaches that the offering of the Festival, which is the two loaves offering, precedes the bringing of the first fruits of the wheat harvest. I have derived only that the two loaves precede the first fruits of the wheat harvest. From where do I derive that they also precede the bringing of the first fruits of the barley harvest? The verse states with regard to the festival of Shavuot: “And the festival of the harvest, the first fruits of your labors, which you will sow in the field” (Exodus 23:16). The order of the verse teaches that the offering of the Festival, which is the two loaves offering, precedes all forms of first fruits that are sown in the field, which includes barley.

ואין לי אלא שתזרע עלו מאליהן מנין תלמוד לומר בשדה From this verse, I have derived only that the two loaves precede the bringing of the first fruits that sprouted from seeds you sowed, as the verse states: “Which you will sow.” From where do I derive that they precede even the bringing of first fruits that sprouted by themselves? The continuation of that verse states: “In the field” (Exodus 23:16). The term is superfluous and serves to include even produce that sprouted by itself.

ואין לי אלא בשדה מנין לרבות שבגג ושבחורבה ושבעציץ ושבספינה תלמוד לאמר (במדבר יח, יג) בכורי כל אשר בארצם The baraita continues: From this verse, I have derived only that the two loaves precede the bringing of produce that grew in a field. From where do I derive to include even produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, or that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship? The verse states with regard to the priestly gifts: “The first fruit of all that grows in their land, which they shall bring to the Lord, shall be yours” (Numbers 18:13). The term “first fruits” in this verse is referring to all types of first fruits. This teaches that when the two loaves are referred to as the first fruits (see Exodus 34:22), the intention is that they should be brought first before all other types of produce.

מנין שתהא קודמת לנסכים ופירות האילן נאמר כאן בכורי מעשיך ונאמר להלן (שמות כג, טז) באספך את מעשיך מן השדה מה להלן נסכים ופירות אילן אף כאן נסכים ופירות אילן The baraita concludes: From where is it derived that the offering of the two loaves is to precede both the bringing of libations from grapes of the new crop and the bringing of the first fruits of the tree? It is stated here, with regard to the two loaves: “The first fruits of your labors” (Exodus 23:16), and it is stated there at the end of that verse: “When you gather in the products of your labors from the field.” Just as there, the term “your labors” is referring both to fruits used for the libations and the fruit of the tree, so too, here, the term is referring to both fruits used for the libations and the fruit of the tree.

קתני מיהא שבגג שבחורבה שבעציץ ושבספינה סיפא אתאן למנחות Rabbi Aḥa bar Abba explains how the baraita poses a challenge to Ulla’s ruling: In any event, it was taught in this baraita that bringing the two loaves must precede even the bringing of produce that grew on a roof, that grew in a ruin, that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship. This indicates that all these types of produce are valid to be brought as first fruits, despite the fact that they are of inferior quality. This would appear to contradict Ulla’s ruling that dates that grow in the mountains and produce grown in the valleys are not fit to be brought as first fruits. Rabba explains: Whereas in the first clause, the baraita discusses which types of produce can be used for the first fruits, in the latter clause we come to discuss which grains can be used for meal offerings. Produce that grew in these atypical locations is valid to be brought as meal offerings, but not as first fruits.

מתקיף לה רב אדא בר אהבה אי הכי היינו דכתיב (במדבר יח, יא) כל טהור בביתך יאכל אותו ואי מנחות לזכרי כהונה הוא דמיתאכלן The later clause of the baraita explained that the verse: “The first fruit of all that grows in their land” (Numbers 18:13), is referring to produce that grows in atypical locations. Rabba defended Ulla’s opinion by explaining that the verse concerns meal offerings only. Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this: If so, that which is written in the latter part of the verse: “Any pure member of your household may eat of it,” is difficult, as the phrase “your household” includes a priest’s wife and daughters and teaches that they may also partake of the priestly gifts referred to in the verse; but if the verse is referring to meal offerings, that is problematic as they are permitted to be eaten only by male priests.

אמר רב משרשיא תרי קראי כתיבי (במדבר יח, יג) לך יהיה וכתיב כל טהור בביתך יאכל אותו הא כיצד כאן בביכורים כאן במנחות In resolution of this difficulty, Rav Mesharshiyya said: Perforce this verse should be read as if two verses are written, as otherwise it contains an inherent contradiction: The first clause states: “The first fruit…shall be yours” (Numbers 18:13), indicating that only a priest himself may partake of the priestly gifts. And it is written in the continuation of the verse: “Any pure member of your household may eat of it,” indicating that even female family members may partake of it. How can these texts be reconciled? Here, the latter part of the verse, concerns the first fruits, which even female family members may eat, and there, the first part of the verse, concerns meal offerings, which may be eaten only by male priests.

רב אשי אמר כוליה במנחות וסיפא דקרא אתאן ללחמי תודה Rav Ashi said that there is an alternative resolution: The verse in its entirety concerns meal offerings, but with the latter clause of the verse we come to the specific case of the loaves of a thanks offering, which even female family members of the priest may eat.

בפלוגתא ר' יוחנן אמר אם הביא לא קדש ריש לקיש אמר אם הביא קדש נעשה ככחוש בקדשים § The Gemara notes: Ulla and Rav Aḥa bar Abba disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of earlier amora’im: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if one did bring mountain dates or valley produce as first fruits, he does not thereby consecrate them, i.e., they do not attain the sanctified status of first fruits. Reish Lakish says: If one did bring them, he has consecrated them; they are regarded just like a gaunt animal with regard to sacrificial animals. Although it is improper to consecrate such animals or such produce as an offering, if one does, the consecration certainly takes effect.

בשלמא ריש לקיש כדאמר טעמא אלא רבי יוחנן מאי טעמא אמר רבי אלעזר רבי יוחנן חזאי בחלום מילתא מעלייתא אמינא אמר קרא (דברים כו, ב) מראשית ולא כל ראשית (דברים כו, ב) מארצך ולא כל ארצך The Gemara discusses the dispute: Granted, the opinion of Reish Lakish is well founded, as he stated the reason for his ruling. But as for Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason for his ruling? Rabbi Elazar said: I have an explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling and since I was privileged to see Rabbi Yoḥanan in a dream, I know that I am saying a proper matter. The verse states with regard to first fruits: “And you shall take from the first of all the fruit” (Deuteronomy 26:2). The addition of the word “from” indicates that one should take from some of the first fruits, but not from all the first fruits. This teaches that one should use only the seven species for the mitzva. The verse continues: “That you shall bring from your land.” The addition of the word “from” indicates that one should take first fruits from some areas of the land, but not from all areas in your land. This teaches that one should not take dates from the mountains or produce from the valleys.

וריש לקיש האי ארצך מאי עביד ליה מיבעי ליה לכדתניא רבן גמליאל בר רבי אומר נאמר כאן ארץ ונאמר להלן ארץ מה להלן שבח ארץ אף כאן שבח ארץ The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, for what halakha does he use this term “your land”? He holds that the term is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabban Gamliel, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, says: “From your land” is stated here (Deuteronomy 26:2), with regard to the first fruits, and “land” is stated there with regard to the praise of Eretz Yisrael: “A land of wheat and barley, vines, figs, and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey” (Deuteronomy 8:8), which are the seven species. This serves as the basis for a verbal analogy and teaches that just as there, the verse is referring only to the produce that is the praise of Eretz Yisrael, so too, here, with regard to the mitzva to bring the first fruits, the verse is referring only to the produce that is the praise of Eretz Yisrael, i.e., the seven species.

ואידך ארץ מארץ The Gemara asks: And the other one, Rabbi Yoḥanan, since he has already expounded the term “from your land” to teach that one may not use mountain dates or valley produce, from where does he derive that only the seven species may be used? Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that since the Torah could have just written “your land” but instead writes “from your land,” the word “land” can be used to form the verbal analogy while the word “from” can teach that one may not use mountain dates or valley produce.

ואידך ארץ מארץ לא משמע ליה And the other one, Reish Lakish, what does he derive from the fact that the Torah adds the word “from”? He does not learn anything from the fact the Torah could have just written “your land” but instead writes “from your land.” In Hebrew, the term: From your land, is expressed by a single word: Me’artzekha. Reish Lakish holds that the verbal analogy uses the entire word.

תני חדא שבגג ושבחורבה שבעציץ ושבספינה מביא וקורא ותניא אידך מביא ואינו קורא § It is taught in one baraita: With regard to produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, or that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship, the owner brings it to the Temple and recites the accompanying passage of thanks to God (see Deuteronomy 26:1–11). And it is taught in another baraita with regard to such fruits: The owner brings them but does not recite the accompanying passage.

בשלמא ריש לקיש גג אגג לא קשיא הא בגג דמערה הא בגג דבית The Gemara attempts to reconcile the baraitot: Granted according to Reish Lakish, both baraitot accord with his opinion that even inferior produce can be brought as first fruits, and they contradict each other only with regard to whether or not one should recite the accompanying passage. And even with regard to that, the fact that the ruling of one baraita about produce that grew on a roof is contradicted by the ruling of the other baraita about produce that grew on a roof is not difficult. One can explain that this baraita, which states that the passage is recited, is referring to a roof of a cave, which is considered part of the ground, whereas that baraita, which states that the passage is not recited, is referring to a roof of a house.

חורבה אחורבה לא קשיא כאן בחורבה עבודה כאן בחורבה שאינה עבודה Similarly, the fact that the ruling of one baraita about produce that grew in a ruin is contradicted by the ruling of the other baraita about produce that grew in a ruin is not difficult. One can explain that here, the baraita that states that the passage is recited, is referring to a cultivated ruin, whereas there, the baraita that states that the passage is not recited, is referring to an uncultivated ruin.

עציץ אעציץ לא קשיא כאן בנקובה כאן בשאינו נקובה And the fact that the ruling of one baraita about produce that grew in a flowerpot is contradicted by the ruling of the other baraita about produce that grew in a flowerpot is not difficult. One can explain that here, the baraita that states that the passage is recited, is referring to a perforated flowerpot, where the produce is able to draw nourishment from the soil beneath it, whereas there, the baraita that states that the passage is not recited, is referring to an unperforated flowerpot.

ספינה אספינה לא קשיא כאן בספינה של עץ כאן בספינה של חרס And the fact that the ruling of one baraita about fruit that grew on a ship is contradicted by the ruling of the other baraita about fruit that grew on a ship is not difficult. One can explain that here, the baraita that states that the passage is recited is referring to a ship made of wood, where the fruit were able to draw nourishment through the wood from the ground, whereas, there, the baraita that states that the passage is not recited is referring to a ship made of earthenware.

אלא לרבי יוחנן קשיא Having reconciled all the apparent contradictions between the two baraitot according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, the Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds inferior produce cannot be consecrated as first fruits, the first baraita is difficult, as it states that inferior produce can be consecrated.

תנאי היא דתניא שבגג ושבחורבה מביא וקורא שבעציץ ושבספינה אינו מביא כל עיקר: The Gemara answers: The baraitot cited above contradict Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion. But there is a dispute between tanna’im with regard to this issue, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, the owner brings it and recites the accompanying passage. With regard to produce that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship, the owner does not bring it at all. Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with that baraita.

וכולן אינן באות אלא מן המובחר כו': אמרי ליה יוחנא וממרא למשה תבן אתה מכניס לעפריים אמר להו אמרי אינשי למתא ירקא ירקא שקול: § The mishna states: And all meal offerings come only from the optimal produce. One of the places the mishna mentions as having good-quality produce is Aforayim. The superior quality of its produce was so well known that Aforayim was used as an example in colloquial aphorisms. In Moses and Aaron’s first meeting with Pharaoh, Aaron cast his staff to the ground, whereupon it turned into a serpent. Pharaoh’s necromancers then duplicated the feat using their incantations, only to then be confounded when Aaron’s staff swallowed up all of theirs (see Exodus 7:10–12). The Gemara relates the conversation that took place: Pharaoh’s two leading necromancers, Yoḥana and Mamre, said to Moses: Are you are bringing straw to Afarayim? Performing necromancy in Egypt, the world leader in sorcery, is like bringing straw to Afarayim, which is rich in the finest grains. Moses said to them: It is as people say: To a city rich in herbs, take herbs. If you want to guarantee that people will appreciate your merchandise, bring it to a place where they are familiar with it.

מתני׳ אין מביאין לא מבית הזבלים ולא מבית השלחים ולא מבית האילן ואם הביא כשר MISHNA: Even when selecting grain for meal offerings from the locations mentioned in the previous mishna, one may not bring as a meal offering grain from a fertilized field, nor from an irrigated field, nor from a field of trees, as such fields do not produce grain of optimal quality. But if one did bring a meal offering of grain from such fields, it is fit.

כיצד הוא עושה נרה שנה ראשונה ובשנה שניה זורעה קודם לפסח שבעים יום והוא עושה סולת מרובה How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, but he does not sow it, and in the second year, he sows it seventy days before Passover, and in that manner it produces grain that will provide an abundance of fine, high-quality, flour.

כיצד בודק הגזבר מכניס ידו לתוכן עלה בה אבק פסולה עד שינפנה How does the Temple treasurer inspect the flour to determine whether it is of sufficiently high quality? The treasurer inserts his hand into the flour. If, when he removes his hand, flour powder covers it, the flour is unfit, until one sifts it with a fine sifter, so that no powder will remain.

ואם התליעה פסולה: And if the flour became wormy, it is unfit for use in a meal offering.

גמ׳ כיצד עושה נרה שנה ראשונה איבעיא להו היכי קאמר נרה שנה ראשונה ושניה נרה וזורעה או דלמא נרה שנה ראשונה ושניה זורעה בלא נרה GEMARA: The mishna states: How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he sows it. The Gemara clarifies what should be done in the second year: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the tanna saying? Is he saying that he plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he plows it and sows it? Or perhaps he is saying that he plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he sows it without plowing it.

תא שמע דתניא אמר רבי יוסי אף חיטי כרזיים וכפר אחים אלמלא סמוכות לירושלים היו מביאין מהן לפי שאין מביאין את העומר אלא מן השדות המודרמות והמנונרות לכך שבהן חמה זורחת ומהן חמה שוקעת The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: Also concerning grain grown in Kerazayim and Kefar Aḥim, if only those places had been close to Jerusalem, they would have brought barley from them for the omer. As the halakha is that one brings the omer only from the southern fields and those that were plowed for that purpose, as upon such fields, the sun rises and shines, and from those fields, the sun also sets. In other words, those fields are exposed to a lot of sunlight, so they produce a superior-quality crop. Kerazayim and Kefar Aḥim were such fields, but they were too far from Jerusalem for their barley to be used for the omer offering.

כיצד עושה נרה שנה ראשונה ושניה חורש ושונה וזורעה קודם לפסח שבעים יום כדי שתהא סמוכה לחמה ועושה קנה זרת ושיבולת זרתיים The baraita continues: How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, and in the second year, he plows it once and then repeats the plowing a second time, and he sows it seventy days before Passover. It is done this way in order that the sowing will be done close to the time when the strength of the sun reaches its climax, and will thereby produce a high-quality crop in which the length of a stalk is a handspan and the ear itself is two handspans.

וקוצר ומעמר ודש וזורה ובורר וטוחן ומרקד ומביא אצל גזבר וגזבר מכניס ידו לתוכה אם עלתה בה אבק אומר לו חזור ונפה אותה שניה משום רבי נתן אמרו גזבר סך ידו שמן ומכניס לתוכה עד שמעלה כל אבקה And then one reaps the grain and gathers it together into a pile, and then he threshes the grain and winnows it, and then he sorts the inedible admixture from the edible grain, and then he grinds the grain and sifts it and brings the flour produced to the Temple treasurer. And the treasurer inserts his hand into it in order to check its quality. If upon removing his hand powder covers it, the treasurer says to the owner: Go back and sift it a second time. The Sages say in the name of Rabbi Natan that the treasurer would perform a more thorough examination of the flour’s quality. He douses his hand with oil and then inserts it into the flour until all of its powder will be brought up.

קתני מיהת חורש ושונה The Gemara explains that the baraita provides a resolution to the dilemma: In any event, the baraita teaches that during the second year, the owner of the field plows it once and then repeats the plowing. It is explicit, then, that during the second year the field should be plowed.

ולטעמיך מתניתין לא קתני שונה The Gemara rejects this proof: But even according to your reasoning, ultimately the mishna does not teach that he plows the field and then repeats the plowing;

ברייתא קתני שונה it is only the baraita that teaches that he plows and then repeats the plowing. It would appear, then, that the mishna and baraita express different opinions, and it may be that according to the mishna one does not need to plow in the second year at all.

הא לא קשיא כאן בעבודה כאן בשאינה עבודה The Gemara dismisses this suggestion: This is not difficult; it is possible that the mishna and the baraita do not disagree, and here, the mishna, which does not require plowing a second time, is referring to a cultivated field, whereas there, the baraita is referring to an uncultivated field, and therefore it requires that the field be plowed a second time.

מאי הוי עלה תא שמע דתניא ניר חציה וזורע חציה ניר חציה וזורע חציה The Gemara concludes: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Come and hear the resolution from that which is taught in a baraita: For the first year, one plows the entire field during the first half of the year, and then he sows half of the field, leaving the other half fallow. For the second year, one again plows the entire field during the first half of the year, and then he sows the half of the field that was left fallow in the previous year. It is evident from this baraita that during the second year as well, the field is plowed before it is sown.

אמר רבי יוחנן אין מביאין את העומר אלא מן השדות המודרמות שבארץ ישראל שבהן חמה זורחת ומהן חמה שוקעת § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One brings the omer only from the southern fields of Eretz Yisrael, as upon those fields, the sun rises and shines, and from those fields, the sun also sets. Those fields are exposed to abundant sunlight, and so they produce a superior-quality crop.

תניא נמי הכי אבא שאול אומר עומר היה בא מבקעת בית מקלה כבת ג' סאין היתה ושדה מודרמת היתה ובה חמה זורחת וממנה חמה שוקעת ניר חציה וזורע חציה ניר חציה וזורע חציה This is also taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul says that the omer would come from grain grown in the valley of Beit Mikle. The field there was about three se’a, and it was a southern field, and the sun would rise and shine upon it, and the sun would set from it. During the first year, the farmer plowed the entire field during the first half of the year, and he then sowed half of the field, leaving the other half fallow. During the second year, he again plowed the entire field during the first half of the year, and he then sowed the half of the field that was left fallow in the previous year.

רב חלקיה בר טובי הוה ליה קרנא דארעא ניר חציה וזרע חציה ניר חציה וזרע חציה ועבדה על חד תרי ומזבין להו לחיטי לסמידא: The Gemara demonstrates the efficacy of this method: Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi had a tract of land. He plowed the field during the first half of the year and then sowed half of it. The next year, he plowed the field during the first half of the year and then sowed the other half of it. And this method was so effective that his field produced twice as much wheat as other fields its size, and it was of such a superior quality that he sold the wheat to be used as fine flour [lismida] for the meal offerings in the Temple.

ואם התליעה פסולה: תנו רבנן סולת שהתליעה רובה פסולה וחיטין שהתליעו רובן פסולות בעי רבי ירמיה ברוב חטה או ברוב סאה תיקו: § The mishna teaches: And if the flour became wormy, it is unfit for use in a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: Fine flour the majority of which became wormy is unfit. And similarly, wheat kernels the majority of which became wormy are unfit, and they may not be used to produce fine flour for meal offerings. Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the meaning of this latter ruling? Is it saying only that if the majority of an individual wheat kernel becomes wormy the flour produced from it is unfit, or is it saying that when the majority of a se’a of kernels becomes wormy the entire se’a is unfit? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבא הקדישן מהו שילקה עליהן משום בעל מום כיון דפסיל כבעל מום דמי או דלמא אין בעל מום אלא בבהמה תיקו: Rava asks: If one consecrated grains of wormy wheat for use in a meal offering, what is the halakha with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating them due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? One is flogged for consecrating a blemished animal as an offering (see Temura 6b); does the same apply to consecrating wormy wheat? Does one say that since the wheat is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps, the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

תנן התם כל עץ שנמצא בו תולעת פסול לגבי מזבח אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא לח אבל יבש גוררו וכשר § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Middot 2:5) with regard to the wood logs that are burned on the altar: Priests inspect them before they are used and any log in which a worm is found is unfit for use on the altar. In reference to this mishna, Shmuel says: They taught this halakha only with regard to a wet log, as a wormy section cannot be removed. But if a wormy section is found in a dry log, the priest scrapes the wormy spot away, and the log is fit for use.

בעי רבא הקדישו מהו שילקה עליו משום בעל מום כיון דפסול כבעל מום דמי או דלמא אין בעל מום אלא בבהמה תיקו: Rava asks: If one consecrated a wormy log to be used on the altar, what is the halakha with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating it due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? Does one say that since the log is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps, the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מתני׳ תקוע אלפא לשמן אבא שאול אומר שניה לה רגב בעבר הירדן כל הארצות היו כשרות אלא מיכן היו מביאין MISHNA: Olive trees in Tekoa are the primary source of oil to be used in meal offerings. Abba Shaul says: Secondary to Tekoa is Regev on the east bank of the Jordan River. All the regions were valid for oil to be brought from them, but it was from here that they would bring it.

אין מביאין לא מבית הזבלים ולא מבית השלחים ולא מן מה שנזרע ביניהם ואם הביא כשר אין מביאין אנפקטן ואם הביא כשר אין מביאין מן הגרגרין שנשרו במים ולא מן הכבשים ולא מן השלוקים ואם הביא פסול: One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives taken from a fertilized olive grove, nor from olives taken from an irrigated olive grove, nor from olives taken from an olive grove where grain was sown between the trees. But if one did bring a meal offering containing oil from such groves, it is valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from unripe olives [anpiktan], but if one did bring it, it is valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives that were soaked in water, nor from pickled olives, nor from boiled olives, and even if one did bring it, it is not valid.

גמ׳ (שמואל ב יד, ב) וישלח יואב תקועה ויקח משם אשה חכמה מאי שנא תקועה אמר רבי יוחנן מתוך שרגילין בשמן זית חכמה מצויה בהן: GEMARA: The Gemara notes the effect of Tekoa’s oil on those living there: The verse states: “And Joab sent to Tekoa, and fetched from there a wise woman” (II Samuel 14:2). What is different about Tekoa that Joab chose to bring a woman from there? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Since the residents of Tekoa are accustomed to use olive oil, wisdom is prevalent there.

תנו רבנן (דברים לג, כד) וטובל בשמן רגלו זה חלקו של אשר שמושך שמן כמעין אמרו פעם אחת נצרכו להן אנשי לודקיא בשמן מינו להן פולמוסטוס אחד אמרו לו לך והבא לנו שמן במאה ריבוא § The Gemara digresses to discuss the tribal portion of Asher, in which the city of Tekoa is located: The Sages taught in a baraita: In his blessing to the tribe of Asher, Moses said: “He will be pleasing to his brothers, and immerse his foot in oil” (Deuteronomy 33:24). This is referring to the portion of Asher, as the oil flows there like a spring. The Gemara relates: They said that once, the people of Laodicea were in need of oil. They appointed a gentile messenger [polmostos] and said to him: Go and bring us one million maneh worth of oil.

הלך לירושלים אמרו לו לך לצור הלך לצור אמרו לו לך לגוש חלב הלך לגוש חלב אמרו לו לך אצל פלוני לשדה הלז ומצאו שהיה עוזק תחת זיתיו אמר לו יש לך שמן במאה ריבוא שאני צריך אמר לו המתן לי עד שאסיים מלאכתי המתין עד שסיים מלאכתו He first went to Jerusalem to procure the oil, but residents there did not have that quantity of oil. They said to him: Go to Tyre, which was a commercial city. He went to Tyre, but they also did not have enough oil. They said to him: Go to Gush Ḥalav, which is located in the portion of Asher. He went to Gush Ḥalav, and they said to him: Go to so-and-so, to that field. He went there and found someone hoeing [ozek] under his olive trees. The messenger said to that man: Do you have the one million maneh worth of oil that I need? The man said to him: Wait for me until I complete my labor, i.e., hoeing. The messenger waited until the man completed his labor.

לאחר שסיים מלאכתו הפשיל כליו לאחוריו והיה מסקל ובא בדרך אמר לו יש לך שמן במאה ריבוא כמדומה אני ששחוק שחקו בי היהודים כיון שהגיע לעירו הוציאה לו שפחתו קומקמום של חמין ורחץ בו ידיו ורגליו הוציאה לו ספל של זהב מליאה שמן וטבל בו ידיו ורגליו לקיים מה שנאמר וטובל בשמן רגלו After he completed his labor, the man slung his tools over his shoulders behind him, a manner typical of poor laborers, and started walking, and he was removing stones from his orchard as he went along the path. Upon seeing this behavior, which suggested the man was merely a laborer, the messenger questioned whether the man was truly able to provide him with the oil. He said to the man: Can it be that you really have the one million maneh worth of oil that I need? It seems to me that the Jews of Gush Ḥalav are making a laughingstock of me by sending me here. When he reached his city, the man’s maidservant brought out to him a kettle [kumkemos] of hot water, and he washed his hands and his feet. Afterward, she brought out to him a golden basin filled with oil, in which he immersed his hands and feet, in fulfillment of that which is stated with regard to the Tribe of Asher: “And immerse his foot in oil” (Deuteronomy 33:24).

לאחר שאכלו ושתו מדד לו שמן במאה ריבוא אמר לו כלום אתה צריך ליותר אמר לו הן אלא שאין לי דמים אמר לו אם אתה רוצה ליקח קח ואני אלך עמך ואטול דמיו מדד לו שמן בשמונה עשר ריבוא אמרו לא הניח אותו האיש לא סוס ולא פרד ולא גמל ולא חמור בארץ ישראל שלא שכרו After they ate and drank, the man measured out for the messenger one million maneh worth of oil. The man said to him: Are you sure that you do not need any more oil? The messenger said to him: Yes, I do need more, but I do not have the money for it. The man said to him: If you wish to take more oil, take it and I will go back to Laodicea with you and collect the money for the extra oil there. The messenger agreed and the man measured out an additional 180,000 maneh worth of oil. Concerning this incident, people said: The messenger had such an enormous burden of oil that he left neither a horse, nor a mule, nor a camel, nor a donkey in all of Eretz Yisrael that he did not rent in order to help transport the oil back to Laodicea.

כיון שהגיע לעירו יצאו אנשי עירו לקלסו אמר להם לא לי קלסוני אלא לזה שבא עמי שמדד לי שמן במאה ריבוא והרי נושה בי בשמונה עשרה ריבוא לקיים מה שנאמר (משלי יג, ז) יש מתעשר ואין כל מתרושש והון רב: When the messenger finally reached his city, the people of his city came out to praise him [lekaleso] for achieving this tremendous feat. The messenger said to them: Do not praise me. Rather, praise this man who has come with me, as it is he who measured for me one million maneh worth of oil, and he extended a debt to me for 180,000 maneh worth of oil. This incident was in fulfillment of that which is stated: “There is one who seems to be rich, yet has nothing; there is one who seems to be poor, yet has great wealth” (Proverbs 13:7).

אין מביאין לא מבית הזבלים: והתניא אין מביאין אנפקטן § The mishna teaches: One may not bring a meal offering containing oil made from olives from a fertilized olive grove. The mishna continues to state that one may not bring a meal offering containing oil from unripe olives, and, according to one version of the mishna’s text, it adds that even if one did bring a meal offering containing such oil, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One may not bring a meal offering containing oil made from unripe olives,